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P.

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.  
1235  
1913.

2

Subject:

China

Mongolian situation

This File contains the following papers:—

YEAR.

1914. P. 56 79 1567 ~~2901~~ 2901 5055

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Memoranda.

If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

Register No.

Put away with

1235

13

1083

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O.

Dated 15 March

1915

Rec. 16 March.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	22 March	Atk	Mongolia.  Russian commercial activity
Secretary of State.....	24	T.W.H	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to

India

19/3/15

(19/4/15 in print)

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers:—

743.



In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 26197

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.



W.S.

11743

1235/13

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India  
\_\_\_\_\_ and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.*


*Foreign Office,*

*March 15, 1915.*

*Reference to previous correspondence:*

*Letter to  
from Foreign Office:*

*Description of Inclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Hon. Minister at Peking No. 34 February 3, 1915.</i>	<i>Russo-Mongolian Trade</i> 

*(Similar letter sent to Board of Trade — )*



1083  
15

● THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[March 6.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[26197]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)*

(No. 34.)

Sir,

*Peking, February 3, 1915.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of an extract from the Harbin "Novosti Zizni," regarding Russian trade with Mongolia.

While I am without information as to the accuracy of the figures given for the Russian share of Mongolian trade, it appears probable that the "exceptionally favourable conditions" for Russian enterprise, were, in fact, created by the non-delivery of British goods at Tien-tsin during the first two months of the war. In spite, however, of the duties to which, as pointed out in Mr. Alston's despatch No. 437 of the 21st November, 1913, British goods imported via Tien-tsin are subjected, there appears to be no reason why these should not in the future be able to compete with goods carried by rail from Russia even in the event of a line being constructed from Kiatchka to Urga.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Extract from "Novosti Zizni" of January 4 (17), 1915.*

RUSSIAN AFFAIRS IN MONGOLIA.

AT the present moment, as a result of the decrease in the importation into Mongolia from the south through Tien-tsin and Kalgan of goods of English and German origin in competition with our wares, conditions have been created exceptionally favourable to our trade in Mongolia.

It is clear already that about 80 per cent. of the whole import trade of Mongolia is in Russian hands—in particular, we have gained complete possession of the importation of piece goods, cloth, sugar, ironware, enamelled vessels, matches and tanned leather.

In view of the fact that the total import trade into Outer Mongolia is valued at 12,000,000 roubles, the share of this sum held by us is 9,000,000 roubles.

This expansion of Russo-Mongolian trade is due in a large measure to Russian merchants in Mongolia who are now showing great perseverance and initiative.

For example, orders have recently been received from them for ironware made according to Chinese patterns to which the Mongols are accustomed; viz., stirrups, axes, traps, and irons, &c., &c.

On Lake Kos Gol (51° 0' north, 100° 30' east) in Northern Mongolia, Russians have established a steamship service, the importance of which is considerable, since it provides a substitute for the more difficult portion of the main road from Irkutsk to the heart of Mongolia—Uliassutai.

Finally, owing to the inability of our factories to dye textiles to suit the tastes of the local population, it is intended to send undyed stuffs to Mongolia and to dye them on the spot by Chinese methods, the total cost of which is  $\frac{1}{2}$  kopeck per arshine—cheaper, that is, than the cost of dyeing by machinery.

[2381 f—1]



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9 APR 1915

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743  
(728)

~~Secret~~ Department.

13

1915

Rec. 18 & 22 Feb

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	24 Feb.	ABA	<u>Mongolia.</u>
Secretary of State.....	27	J. W. H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			Russian enterprise in Mongolia:
Secretary of State.....			1. The Russo-Mongol railway convention
			2. Proposed formation of a National Bank of Mongolia
			3. Proposed extension to Urga of projected railway line from Verkhne Udeinsk to Kiakhla.

Put By C. 1. III. 15-

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12/2.

1. (of F.O. No. 16689 + inclos.) 26/2  
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FOR INFORMATION.

The upshot of these papers seems to be that Russia, notwithstanding the war, shows no signs of slackening her activity in Mongolia. The remarks on pp. 7-8 about the effects of the disappearance of Germany from Tsingtao upon Russia's interests in the far east are noteworthy.

(A regards the projected railway to Urga:—Kerkhœ Udinsk is a town on the Trans-Siberian railway, about 70 miles East of L. Baikal. Kiekhita is situated on the Russo-Mongolian frontier about 110 miles S. of Kerkhœ Udinsk, & 180 miles N. of Urga.)

*Previous Papers :—*

5055/14 etc



THIBET AND MONGOLIA

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 14.]

SECTION 1.

[5086]

No. 1.

Mr. Macleay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14, 1915.)

(No. 408.)

Sir,

Peking, December 10, 1914.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 352 of the 9th October, I have the honour to report that Reuter's agency here announce the signature on the 30th September at Kiachta by the Russian Diplomatic Agent in Mongolia and the plenipotentiary of the Government of Urga of an agreement giving to the Russian Postal and Telegraphic Administration a concession for the construction of a telegraph line from Monda in the Government of Irkutsk to Uliassutai.

I enclose copy of an extract from the "Peking Gazette" of to-day's date containing the translation published by Reuter's of the text of a railway agreement\* concluded at the same time between the Russian and Mongolian Governments,\* whereby the former recognises the permanent right of the latter to build railways within the boundaries of its own territory, and makes certain stipulations in regard to the assistance to be given in the matter of such railway construction and the linking up of the Mongolian and Russian railway systems. The agreement further provides that, should the Mongolian Government desire to grant a railway concession to a private person, they must first consult the Russian Government with a view to ascertaining whether the latter would consider the contemplated line as likely to prove prejudicial to Russia's economic interests.

The Chinese Government apparently object to the conclusion of this agreement as contravening their rights of suzerainty over Mongolia, and it is believed that they will enter a formal protest against their exclusion from the negotiations, if they have not already done so. I learn, however, from the Russian Minister that his Government consider that Mongolia's freedom of action in regard to the construction of railways is secured by article 3 of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of the 5th November, 1913, which recognises the exclusive rights of the Mongols in Outer Mongolia to control the internal administration of that country, and to settle all questions of a commercial or industrial character affecting it without interference from the Chinese Government.

M. Kroupensky also informed me that the Tripartite Conference now being held at Kiachta was making no progress whatever, owing to the obstructive tactics of the Chinese representatives, who were insisting on the right of the Chinese Government to discuss the question of railway and telegraph construction in Outer Mongolia, and he expressed the belief that the Russian Government would be compelled soon to break off the negotiations, which had reached a deadlock.

(Copies sent to Tokyo, Petrograd, and India.)

I have, &c.

RONALD MACLEAY.

\* Not printed.

[2336 o—1]



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12/2/15

x see P. 5055/14  
below



(2.)

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 29.]

P  
743

SECTION 1.

1915

[11082]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)*

(No. 8.)

Sir,

*Petrograd, January 13, 1915.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 50, dated the 7th February, 1913, and previous correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the enclosed memorandum on the subject of the establishment of a national bank of Mongolia.

I have, &c.

G. W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Memorandum respecting National Bank of Mongolia.*

WITH reference to Sir G. Buchanan's despatch No. 50, dated the 7th February, 1913, and previous correspondence, the Russian official "Trade Gazette" reports that the Minister for Finance, in accordance with the powers entrusted him by the Council of Ministers, has finally approved of the formation of a national bank of Mongolia by a financial group in which the Siberian-Commercial Bank is largely interested.

The capital has been fixed at 1,000,000 roubles, and the directorate of the bank is to be in Petrograd, with branches at Urga, Uliasutai and Kobdo.

The Mongolian Government are to receive 15 per cent. of the nett annual profits, and have been given the right to purchase the bank, if so desirous, upon the expiry of fifty years from the date of commencement of operations, which it is stated will be the 1st (14th) January, 1915.

The "Trade Gazette" describes the proposed operations of the bank as "very varied and resembling in this respect the transactions of the Russo-Asiatic Bank."

*Petrograd, January 13, 1915.*

[2336 ff—1]



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19 FEB 1915




In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No.

16689

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.



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1/1 5055/14  
2.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India  
\_\_\_\_\_ and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,

Put away with


1235/13

February 20, 1915.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to  
from Foreign Office:

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Mr Minister at Peking No. 12 January 11. 1915	Mongolia: Russian Activities in 

(Similar letter sent to Board of Trade  
War Office)



THIBET AND MONGOLIA

CONFIDENTIAL.

728/115  
[February 12.]

SECTION 1.

[16689]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 12.)

Sir,

Peking, January 11, 1915.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, in continuation of my despatch No. 408 of the 10th December last, two extracts from the Harbin press regarding the suggested extension to Urga of the projected Verkhneudinsk-Kiakhta Railway.

The enclosed extracts together with additional information which has reached me from Harbin point to the fact that the war in which Russia is now engaged is not to lead to any diminution in her activity in Mongolia and North Manchuria. It is, for instance, stated that the sum of 1,000,000 roubles of Government funds is to be expended during the current year on construction of the Verkhneudinsk-Kiakhta line and that the construction of the Amur railway is also to be pushed forward. The chief engineer of the latter line is even said to favour the employment of Chinese labour—a course to which the Priamur authorities have been previously opposed.

While the above-mentioned activity in railway construction is doubtless due to strategic considerations, it would appear from the proposed organisation of a Sino-Russian-Japanese Company (see Enclosure 2) that, in view of the elimination of German trade from Far Eastern markets, the moment is considered by the Russian Government as propitious for securing those markets for her own commerce. A further proof that economic questions are not to be neglected owing to the present crisis is furnished by the reported intention of the Russian Government to introduce a regular silver currency into Mongolia. I have the honour to enclose an extract from the "Novosti Zizni" dealing with this subject.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

5055/14  
Extract from the "Harbinski Viestnik" of December 14 (27), 1914.

IN connection with the agreement concluded between Russia and Mongolia in the matter of railroad construction in Mongolia, the Council of Ministers has entrusted to the Minister of Finances the consideration of the question of the desirability of extending to Urga the railway to Kiakhta the construction of which has been decided.

In order to enable the fulfilment of the task allotted by the Council of Ministers, a special inter-departmental conference will in the immediate future be held in the Department of Railway Affairs.

This action of the Minister is due to the desire of the Budget Committee of the Imperial Duma to deal with the matter in their report on the Estimates of the Revenues and Expenditures of the Administration of Railways for the year 1915.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Extract from the "Novosti Zizni" of December 16 (29), 1914.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE VERKHNEUDINSK-URGA RAILWAY.

NOTWITHSTANDING the outbreak of war, railway construction in Siberia will not be arrested. In Petrograde an inter-departmental conference has been convened to consider the question of the construction of a railway from Verkhneudinsk to Urga. Originally, as is known, it was intended to build a railroad from Verkhneudinsk to Kiakhta and the Bill relating thereto was adopted by the Imperial Duma. At the present moment

[2364 m-1]



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9 APR 1915

\* 26 mch 15 in typewriting



there is the possibility—the expediency and opportuneness that is—of a railroad from Verkhneudinsk to Urga. The reasons for such an idea are to be found in the altered economic position of Russia in Mongolia and the Far East. The fall of the German Fortress of Tsingtao and the expulsion of German trade from almost all of the Far Eastern ports furnishes Russian industry and trade with an abundant opportunity to secure for itself various markets in China. The Far Eastern Department of the Russian Export Chamber has stated that Russian industry may obtain a considerable share of the demands of the Chinese.

In order to secure a closer connection between Russia, Japan and China, it is proposed to organise a Sino-Russian-Japanese Company, the principal object of which is the co-ordination of the contemplated reciprocal commercial relations between these three countries. The conference has also considered the question of the delimitation of the spheres of the economic influence of Russia and Japan and came to the conclusion that such a delimitation is capable of realisation and is also being projected from the Japanese side.

In view of all these considerations, the decision of the conference regarding the question of the construction of the Verkhneudinsk-Urga Railway was in principle of an affirmative nature. For the time being the method of the construction of this line was left open—whether, that is, it should be built by means of a concession or at government expense. In all probability, the conference recognised the importance of beginning the construction in the spring of 1915, and of proceeding therewith at great speed in order to complete the work in two years.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

*Extract from the "Novosti Zizni" of December 12 (25), 1914.*

(Translation).

#### RUSSIAN SILVER COINAGE FOR MONGOLIA.

AS is known, before the outbreak of war, Russian cattle-dealers, tea traders and other merchants connected with the barter trade with the Mongols operated with Hamburg silver (in shoes). The Mongols had become so accustomed to the Hamburg silver that they had confidence in it alone. The position of affairs has now changed. The Russian Government has granted to the Siberian Trading Bank the right to issue money in Mongolia which money will be coined by the Russian Mint. On one side of the coins the value will be impressed in the Russian language, and a corresponding impression in Mongolian will be made on the reverse. For exchange purposes, the money will be equal to the Russian rouble. The money will be brought into use by the Mongolian Government in March of the coming year and will represent the legal tender of Mongolia. A monetary reform of this kind will, in the opinion of its initiators and the Mongolian Government, regularise financial dealings in Mongolia and entirely destroy the influence of Germany acquired by means of its Hamburg silver.

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Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

J. O. Pruitts.

Dated

1914

Rec. 19 &amp; 21 Dec

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	29 Dec	US	Mongolia Russo-Mongolian railway & telegraph Conventions
Secretary of State.....	30	US	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

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FOR INFORMATION.


Previous Papers:—



THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[November 27.]

CONFIDENTIAL.



[76091]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)*

(No. 285.)

Sir,

*Petrograd, November 17, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of an agreement respecting railway construction in Mongolia which has been concluded between the Imperial Russian and Mongolian Governments and signed at Kiakhta on the 30th September, 1914.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Agreement respecting Railway Construction in Mongolia.*

THE "Bulletin of Laws" No. 294 (Series No. 1), dated the 28th October (10th November), 1914, publishes the following text of an agreement respecting railway construction in Mongolia concluded between the Imperial Russian and Mongolian Governments and signed at Kiakhta on the 17th (30th) September, 1914:—

*"Agreement.*

"Recognising the necessity, with the development of commercial relations in Mongolia, of establishing communication between Mongolian railways and the nearest railway system, which is the Siberian Railway, by the construction of the necessary lines, the Russian Imperial and Mongolian Governments have made the following friendly agreement:—

"1. The Russian Imperial Government recognise the right in perpetuity of the Mongolian Government to construct railways within the limits of their own territory.

"2. The Russian Imperial and Mongolian Governments conjointly will discuss and determine the most advantageous route for the railways which are to serve Mongolia and Russia, and similarly the method of construction of the railways specified.

"3. The Russian Imperial Government will assist the Mongolian Government in the construction of these railways by building them either at the cost of the Russian Imperial and Mongolian Governments or by means of private capital.

"4. With the construction of railways uniting Russian frontier railway lines, the Russian Imperial and Mongolian Governments will discuss the conditions for connection of the Russian and Mongolian railways, the rights and revenue of the country.

"5. In view of the fact that the Mongolian Government have the right to construct railways within the limits of their territory, the Russian Imperial Government will not intervene should the Mongolian Government desire to construct any useful railway at their own expense. As regards the grant to anyone of railway concessions, the Mongolian Government, by virtue of their entirely friendly relations with the neighbouring great Russian State, will consult with the Russian Imperial Government, previous to the grant of any such concession, as to whether the projected railways will be economically or strategically injurious to Russia.

"6. The present agreement is drawn up in duplicate in the Russian and Mongolian languages. Upon its signature and the affixing of the seals, one copy will

[2295 dd—1]

Copy to India  
25 DEC 1914





be retained in the Russian consulate-general in Mongolia and the second copy in the Mongolian Ministry for Foreign Affairs."

[Here follow the signatures of the Mongolian Ministers for the Interior, Finance and for Foreign Affairs, together with the signature of the Imperial Russian diplomatic agent and consul-general in Mongolia.]

*Kiakhta, 17 (30) September, 1914.*

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In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 76092

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.

5055

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India

and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,

December 18, 1914.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office:  
from

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Hon. Ambassador at Petrograd No. 286 November 17, 1914	Russo-Mongolian Telegraph Agreement, 1911



(Similar letter sent to Board of Trade)




THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[November 27.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

[76092]

No. 1.



Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 286.)

Sir,

Petrograd, November 17, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation from the "Bulletin of Laws" of the text of an agreement concluded between Russia and the Government of Urga granting the Russian Central Administration of Posts and Telegraphs a concession for the construction of a telegraph line from the settlement of Monda in the Government of Irkutsk to the Mongolian town of Uliasutai.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Telegraph Concessions in Mongolia.*

THE "Bulletin of Laws" No. 294 (Series No. 1), dated the 28th October (10th November), 1914, publishes the following text of the agreement concluded between Russia and the Government of Urga granting the Russian Central Administration of Posts and Telegraphs a concession for the construction of a telegraph line from the Settlement of Monda in the Government of Irkutsk to the Mongolian town of Uliasutai.

With a view to facilitating communication between the Russian frontier and the town of Uliasutai, and also between this town and the capital of the Mongolian State, Urga, the Government of Mongolia grant to the Central Administration of Posts and Telegraphs in Russia a concession to construct a telegraph line between Monda-Uliasutai on the following conditions:—

1. The Central Administration of Posts and Telegraphs accepts all expenditure, and undertakes all work in the construction of the line mentioned, receiving in return full control and all working rights over the line.

2. The connection of Monda with Uliasutai will be carried out upon signature of the present agreement, and the Mongolian Government will afford the Central Administration all possible assistance in the construction of the line by the felling and carriage of timber and necessary materials, payment for which will be determined in accordance with existing prices.

3. The Mongolian Government will sanction along the whole length of the line, in such places as may be deemed necessary, the construction of buildings for telegraph stations and other requirements of the line, and will allot the requisite ground.

4. The Mongolian Government undertakes not to construct at their own cost, or to grant to any others, the construction of lines in opposition to the line in question.

5. In the event of a desire to construct telegraph lines in any other direction, the Mongolian Government undertake to offer the concession for such first of all to the Russian Central Administration of Posts and Telegraphs.

6. The rate per word for telegrams exchanged between Uliasutai and the Russian line shall be 15 copecks (about *4d.*), of which 10 copecks shall go to the Central Administration and 5 copecks to the Mongolian Government.

7. The Mongolian Government shall receive 5 copecks per word in the case of telegrams sent in transit through Russia from one point in Mongolia to another.

8. Mongols serving on the telegraph line will be appointed and paid by the

[2295 dd—2]

Copy to India  
25 DEC 1914



Central Administration, and will be under the control of Russian telegraphic officials at the respective stations.

9. Upon the expiry of thirty years the Mongolian Government shall have the right to purchase the line in question at a just price, in accordance with reciprocal agreement with the Central Administration. Upon the expiry of fifty years, if not purchased before this date, the line will become the property of the Mongolian Government free of all charge.

10. Technical details of maintenance and the working of the line will be established by a supplementary agreement.

11. The present agreement is in duplicate in the Mongol and Russian languages, and is confirmed by seals and signatures. Each party will retain one copy.

[Here follow the signatures of the Mongolian Ministers for the Interior and for Finance, and of the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, together with the signature of the Imperial Russian Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General in Mongolia (Miller.)]

*Kiakhta, September 17 (30), 1914.*

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73

Minute Paper.

2001

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O

Dated

} 23 July, 1914

Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....			<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....			
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 24 July, 1914

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers :—

2259

etc



THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[November 22.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[52946]

No. 1.

Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 417. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

Peking, November 8, 1913.

IN confirmation of my telegram No. 246, Very Confidential, of to-day, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the agreement which was signed on the 5th instant by the Russian Minister and the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to Mongolia.

This agreement is the final outcome of the prolonged negotiations reported in Sir John Jordan's despatch No. 228 of the 2nd June and my despatch No. 295 of the 19th July. My Russian colleague declared himself unable for the present to communicate to me the text of this agreement (although it was telegraphed *in extenso* to London by Reuter's agent here on the day of signature), and the version enclosed herein was obtained confidentially from the Japanese Minister.

M. Kroupensky has, however, shown me on Map 22 of the China Inland Mission Atlas the boundaries of what is to be considered as Outer Mongolia. This area comprises the four aimaks of Sassaktu, Sainmoin, Tuchetu, and Tsetsen, as marked by dotted lines on that map, and the boundaries may be said to extend roughly from the Altai to the Khinghan Mountains, following on the south the line of the desert of Gobi—in all a territory nearly as large as the eighteen provinces of China proper.

I have, &c.

B. ALSTON.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Agreement between Russia and China respecting Mongolia, signed November 5, 1913.*

ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>. La Russie reconnaît que la Mongolie-Extérieure se trouve sous la suzeraineté de la Chine.

Art. 2. La Chine reconnaît l'autonomie de la Mongolie-Extérieure.

Art. 3. Reconnaisant le droit exclusive des Mongols de la Mongolie-Extérieure eux-mêmes de pourvoir à l'administration intérieure de la Mongolie autonome et de régler toutes les questions d'ordre commercial et industriel touchant à ce pays, la Chine s'engage à ne pas intervenir dans ces matières et par conséquent n'enverra pas en Mongolie-Extérieure de troupes, n'y entretiendra aucun fonctionnaire civil ou militaire et s'abstiendra de toute colonisation de ce pays. Il est cependant entendu qu'un dignitaire envoyé par le Gouvernement chinois pourra résider à Ourga accompagné du personnel subalterne nécessaire et d'une escorte. En outre, le Gouvernement chinois pourra en cas de besoin entretenir dans certaines localités de la Mongolie-Extérieure à définir au cours des pourparlers prévus à l'article 5 du présent accord des agents pour la protection des intérêts de ses sujets. La Russie, de son côté, s'engage à ne pas maintenir de troupes en Mongolie-Extérieure à l'exception de gardes consulaires, à n'intervenir dans aucune partie de l'administration de ce pays et à s'abstenir de le coloniser.

Art. 4. La Chine se déclare prête à accepter les bons offices de la Russie pour établir ses relations avec la Mongolie-Extérieure conformément aux principes ci-dessus énoncés et aux stipulations du Protocole commercial russo-mongol du 21 octobre, 1912.

Art. 5. Les questions qui ont trait aux intérêts de la Chine et de la Russie dans la Mongolie-Extérieure et qui sont créées par le nouvel état de choses dans ce pays feront l'objet de pourparlers.

[1946 y-1]

22 JUL 1914

Copy to India  
4 JUL 1914



*Note.*

1. La Russie reconnaît que le territoire de la Mongolie-Extérieure fait partie du territoire de la Chine.

2. En ce qui concerne les questions d'ordre politique et territorial, le Gouvernement chinois se mettra d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Russie par des négociations auxquelles les autorités de la Mongolie-Extérieure prendront part.

3. Les pourparlers prévus à l'article 5 de la déclaration auront lieu entre les trois parties intéressées, qui désigneront à cet effet un lieu pour la réunion de leurs délégués.

4. La Mongolie-Extérieure autonome comprendra les régions qui ont été sous la juridiction de l'Amban chinois d'Ourga, du Général tartare d'Ouliassoutaï et de l'Amban chinois de Kobdo. Vu qu'il n'existe pas de cartes détaillées de la Mongolie et que les limites des divisions administratives de ce pays sont incertaines, il est convenu que les limites exactes de la Mongolie-Extérieure ainsi que les délimitations entre le district de Kobdo et le district de l'Altaï feront l'objet des pourparlers prévus à l'article 5 de la déclaration.

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1235

Register No.

1567

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Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O., No. 15908

Dated 18<sup>th</sup> } April 1914.  
Rec. 20<sup>th</sup> }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	23 Apr.	J.S.	W <sup>2</sup> <u>Mongolia</u> Situation in Outer Mongolia : memo- randum by Mr. W. W. Rockhill formerly United States Minister at Peking.
Secretary of State.....	24	J.W.H.	
Committee.....	25	—	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy = sent direct to India

Copy to India, 8 May/14 (Print)

FOR INFORMATION.

Mr. Rockhill, besides being a diplo-  
mat, is a well-known explorer  
and author of works on Central  
Asian travel ("The Land of the  
Lamas", etc. etc.)

The report which he has com-  
municated to Sir J. Jordan is a  
most interesting document. It  
falls into two main parts, the first  
(pp. 4-13) being historical, and the  
second a survey of the present situ-  
ation in Mongolia (pp. 13-31).

His

Seen Pol. Comm.,  
5 MAY 1914

Previous Papers:—

1034



His remarks on Russian policy (pp. <sup>14, 24-29</sup> ~~24-29~~, etc.) are of special interest. On the question whether Russia will succeed in securing the economic control of Outer Mongolia, Mr. Rockhill's conclusions are summarised on pp. 23-24. See also p. 31.

Other passages to which attention may be drawn are: -

- pp.  
17-18 Mongolian finance. [The example given at the top of p. 18 is curious; but it hardly seems to warrant the phrase "infantile incompetence" (*ibid.*:) as applied to Mongol financial methods.]
- 22 Importance of the Tea Trade
- 28 Alleged cruelty practised in Mongolian prisons: on this point, please see the annexed extract from the "Homeward Mail" of 21 Feb. 1914
- 30 Spiritual connection between Tibet and Mongolia  
[see also p. 6]

**The Barbarism of Mongolia.**—Mrs. Herbert T. Bulstrode, who accomplished a remarkable feat last year, when, with but a solitary companion, she travelled over 700 miles by caravan in Mongolia and obtained much new information concerning the institutions and customs of the country, described her experiences to a largely-attended meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society recently. The contrasts of the country—its strong attractiveness and gleams of Western civilisation, and its depravity and barbarity—were vividly sketched. Describing the prisons of the capital, to which she succeeded in gaining admission, the lecturer said:—"Within a small compound, fenced in by high spiked palisades, are five or six dungeons. There are human beings in those dungeons, and among them quite a number of highly-civilised, refined, and gentle Chinese, who are shut up for the remainder of their lives in heavy, iron-bound wooden coffins out of which they never, under any circumstances, or for any purpose, move. They cannot sit upright; they cannot lie down flat. They see daylight but for a few minutes when their food is thrown into their coffins through a hole four or five inches in diameter twice daily. These coffins, of which I counted over fifty—and there were many others which I could not count—are scattered about on the filthy floors of the dungeons. Nothing I can ever see in the future will wipe out the memory of that terrible prison." The Mongolians throw their dead out into the hillsides, where dogs and vultures speedily devour them. Mrs. Bulstrode described the Mongolian as "living, eating, sleeping, getting drunk, and dying in his saddle." He was of the type that would cheat his own mother in a deal, but for the fact that she would probably be one too many for him. Personally she found the people very hospitable, and she had the greatest admiration for their physical development.

"Homeward Mail", 21 Feb. 1914




In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 15908

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.

*Confidential*



The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India  
and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,

April 18, 1914.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office:  
from

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Sir J. Jordan Peking Mar. 23. No. 124. 1914	Outer Mongolia. Memorandum by former U.S. Minister to China.

(Similar letter sent to Board of Trade and Director of military operations.)

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[April 11.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[15908]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)*

(No. 124. Confidential.)

*Peking, March 23, 1914.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum on the present situation in Outer Mongolia which has been communicated to me by Mr. W. W. Rockhill, at one time United States Minister to China.

Mr. Rockhill, who is a recognised authority on Far Eastern questions, arrived in Peking a few months ago after a journey across Mongolia, where he had an opportunity of confirming his impressions by personal observation.

The memorandum enclosed herein reviews the relations between China, Mongolia, and Russia during the past few years, and shows how the latter Power has been compelled, by the force of events and the weakness of China, to gradually replace a defensive by a forward policy, in order to safeguard her interests in the regions which have been specially allotted to her influence by her agreements with Japan and by the tacit acquiescence of other foreign Governments.

Mr. Rockhill's information concerning the relatively unimportant position held by Russian merchants in Mongolian trade bears out the reports previously forwarded to you from this legation. He also indicates the difficulties in the way of the financial and administrative organisation of an autonomous Outer Mongolia.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Memorandum by Mr. Rockhill on the Question of Outer Mongolia.*

THE reversal of Russian policy which followed the termination of the war with Japan was caused, not only by a realisation of that country's military power, but also by the manifest signs that China was adopting a forward policy and that her successful assertion of her rights of sovereignty over her outlying dependencies, Mongolia and Thibet, and her possible ulterior political union with Japan, would expose the sparsely peopled and very imperfectly developed Far Eastern provinces of the Russian Empire to the pacific encroachments and their possible ultimate economic subjugation by the yellow races—the Jews of the East.

Henceforth the dominant idea of Russian policy became the salvation, at all costs, of the provinces east of the Baikal from the yellow peril and the building up in them of a strong, homogeneous, Slav bulwark, which could successfully resist its insidious attacks. In order to attain this end and to rid herself of this obsession, Russia has not hesitated, within the last few years, to sacrifice substantial interests and to pour out vast sums of money in the maintenance of her position in her Far Eastern provinces and Northern Manchuria. She has concluded a series of conventions and agreements with Japan, conceding her various valuable rights and gaining only in return a sense of greater security for the future. She has seriously retarded the development of her Pri-Amur provinces, into which the Russian immigrants come reluctantly at best, by the passage of laws against yellow labour, and has discriminated against Northern Manchurian trade generally, but her efforts to increase thereby Russian colonisation, agricultural development, and the supply of white labour in these regions, have had but the smallest modicum of success. Finally, she has been led to adopt a forward policy in Northern Mongolia and to attempt to create there a buffer State, in the hope of arresting in that direction the peaceful penetration of the dreaded Chinese.

Russia's action in Mongolia is, without doubt, purely defensive. Begun with hesitation, it has been followed with some misgivings, but in all its stages it has been, as I hope to show in this paper, in perfect conformity with the general policy in Eastern Asia pursued for the last six years, and which is based on the profound and general belief among all classes in the yellow peril.

[2102 l—3]

B

Copy to India

8 MAY 1914



The historical and political side of the question of Outer Mongolia is briefly as follows: In the latter part of the fourteenth century the Khalka Mongols, driven from Southern Mongolia by the first Emperor of the Ming dynasty, took up the country they now occupy, and which lies south of Siberia from Kobdo on the west to near Hsi Lung-chiang on the east. They led an independent existence until the latter part of the seventeenth century, when a war broke out between them and their powerful neighbours, the Oelot Mongols, in which they were defeated and driven to seek the aid of the Chinese. The great Kang Hsi was then on the throne of China. In 1691 he called a great durbar of the Khalkas at Dolonor, in South-eastern Mongolia, and there the princes of Outer Mongolia gave in their submission to China and accepted vassalage. Very recent Russian writers have asserted that on this occasion the Khalkas only accepted Chinese suzerainty on three conditions: (i) that their country should not be colonised by Chinese; (ii) that no Chinese troops should be stationed within it; and (iii) that their internal organisation and customs should be respected.

I have not been able, after careful search, to find any contemporary Chinese or foreign document which bears out this assertion, and I am inclined to doubt its accuracy. Du Halde (*Description IV*, 53), quoting presumably from the writings of Father Gerbillon, who was present at the great durbar of 1691, says: "And so this war (with the Oelots) was ended to the glory of the Emperor, who has become the absolute master of the whole empire of the Khalkas and of the Eluths, and has extended his dominion in Tartary to the confines of the Muscovites, which are for the most part bare and uninhabited forests and mountains." The Khalkas have, however, claimed, at least in the preamble to the Urga Convention, if in no other official document, that the recent violation by China of these terms was the principal cause of their secession.

One of the principal instigators, if not the chief one, of this unfortunate war was a Mongol Lama, the brother of one of the most powerful princes of the Khalkas. He had been appointed by the Dalai Lama, of Thibet, the head of the Buddhist Church in Outer Mongolia, and he bore the title of Jebtsum-damba Hutuketu. Shortly after his installation in 1650 he sought to create a schism in the Church, and he had himself recognised as temporal ruler of the country. He was the first of the line of theocrats, all bearing the same title as he, which has since then practically ruled over the confederation of Khalkas tribes.

In the middle of the eighteenth century the then Hutuketu established his residence at the foot of a sacred mountain called the Bogdo ula, which may be the burying place of Genghis Khan, and along the base of which flows the Tula River, an affluent of the Selenga. Near by a lamasery called Gadan was founded, and around it grew up the present town of Urga, Iké Kuré, or Ta Ku-lun, as it is variously called, and which remains the only city of Outer Mongolia, though it ill deserves the name, notwithstanding its 30,000 odd inhabitants, of whom probably a third are lamas.

The first Hutuketu dying in 1724 was succeeded by another Mongol, but as he continued the Separatist intrigues of his predecessor, causing thereby internal dissensions, the Chinese Government decided in 1754 that the secular affairs of the country should be managed by a body of laymen, over which, shortly after, a Mongol governor was appointed as president. In 1757 the second Hutuketu dying, it was decided by China that his successor should be a Thibetan, whose appointment should be confirmed by Peking, and further to ensure the submission of the Khalka tribes, a Manchu Resident or Amban, with a small escort was sent to Urga in 1761, and a Tartar general to Uliassutai. Such has been substantially till the year 1912 the organisation of Outer Mongolia; the eighty-six khosun or "banners" forming the four ajmak, or "tribes" of the Khalkas enjoyed practically autonomous government, subject only to certain light charges and to minor restrictions on their general liberty of government, and without the presence of any Chinese troops within their confines, though Chinese traders and farmers have probably always been welcomed among them, at all events they have never been molested.

Shortly after the Khalkas took up their abode in the region confining on Siberia, the Russians entered into trade relations with them, first from the town of Selenginsk, which was founded in 1666, and later on (from 1727) from Kiakhta, on the frontier between the two countries.

It was only in 1860, however, that Russia obtained by the Treaty of Peking (article 5) the right to establish a consulate at Urga and that Kalgan on the southern border of Mongolia was opened to trade. Shortly after, the present Russian consulate

was built to the east of Urga, between it and the Chinese trading town of Mai Mai Chen, and a Russian Buriat Mongol, Shishmarew by name was appointed to fill the post. This he did for nearly fifty years, his successor having only been appointed in or about 1908.

In 1869 Russia and China signed a further convention at Peking for the land trade between the two countries. Article 1 provided for a free trade zone of 100 li (30 miles) in the two countries along the whole of their frontiers, while article 2 stated that "Russian merchants shall be at liberty to proceed to all parts of Mongolia—for the purposes of trade, and shall likewise be exempt from the levy of duty." This franchise (the Chinese always sought to limit it) accorded Russian trade in Mongolia was reaffirmed in 1881 in the Treaty of St. Petersburg, article 12, with the proviso however that "this immunity shall cease when the development of trade shall necessitate the fixing of a customs tariff after agreement between the two Governments."

Article 15 of the same treaty provided for a decennial revision of this instrument if one of the contracting parties gave notice six months before the expiry of the term, so in 1910 Russia gave notice to China of her desire to negotiate a revision, in the hope of securing a further extension of the free trade enjoyed by her in Mongolia, which alone enabled her traders to compete there with the Chinese. The Chinese Government was then in the full flush of their "rights recovery policy," and intent on nothing less than the absorption of Mongolia, the new dominion and Thibet, and their transformation into ordinary provinces of the Empire, with the consequent establishment of Chinese Administration, an influx of Chinese emigration, and (in the case of Mongolia) its occupation by the military forces of the Empire, with, of course, the application of the general customs tariff, in which measures Russia saw great peril to her thinly-populated border lands and the destruction of her trade.

The establishment of a considerable Chinese military force at Sharasume on the Russian frontier west of Kobo, coupled with the impolitic activity of the Urga Amban, San Tao, who began erecting barracks for troops, taking steps to enrol the Mongols, browbeating the Hutuketu, the princes, and the people, and otherwise showing the lamentable lack of tact and discretion which is a marked feature of the "Young China" reformer; all this confirmed the Russians in their apprehension of Chinese aggression along the whole line of their frontier. The dilatoriness of Peking in replying to Russia's request for treaty revision was an additional source of irritation to the Government of St. Petersburg, and so in the winter of 1910-11 a small body of troops was concentrated at Semipalatinsk to counteract the presence of the Chinese at Sharasume, and shortly after, in March 1911, a peremptory demand was sent to Peking asking the confirmation of Russia's rights under the treaty of 1881. To this China made no definite reply and the matter remained in suspense while unrest grew in Outer Mongolia. Provoked by San Tao's stupidity, by the rising revolution against the Manchus, and, undoubtedly, relying on eventual Russian support as Russia had so frequently of late years announced her "special interest in Mongolia," the Khalkas, on the fall of the Manchu dynasty, expelled the Amban and on the 29th December, 1911, declared the severance of all political ties with China, and chose as their ruler the present profligate Jebtsum-damba Hutuketu, the eighth successor of him who had brought about the subjection of the Khalkas to the Manchu rule.

There can be little doubt but that the Russians must have viewed with real satisfaction the secession of Outer Mongolia, for it supplied them with the means of preventing further Chinese pressure on their borders and of permanently securing the trade privileges they claimed under the treaty of 1881, while running little danger of embroiling themselves seriously with China, with whom they desired to remain, if possible, on the best of terms.

It cannot be denied that the Mongols had good grounds for wishing to put an end to their political relations with China. Their oppression by the officials sent among them was notorious, and it has been acknowledged by the present Government of China. The charge of official malfeasance could not be more strongly put than by Yuan Shih-kai in his proclamation to the Mongols and Thibetans of the 26th March, 1912. "In recent years," he says, "the high officials sent to those border lands have been worthless, all have been most overbearing, there has not been a single one who has endeavoured to put an end to the deception and cruel oppression practised on these peoples. So hostility to China has been aroused everywhere, and discontent has grown general. A source of deep sorrow indeed."

There appears good reason for believing that when the idea of secession was made known to the Russian Government by the unofficial mission which came to



St. Petersburg in the summer of 1911, very little encouragement was actually given it at the Foreign Office, and though the then Russian Minister at Peking, M. Korostowetz, professed the most friendly feelings for the Mongols, whom he thought should be helped, and so advised his Government, the Foreign Minister only tendered the mission his unofficial good offices with China. But immediately after the Mongol Declaration of Independance, the Russian Government announced that the Mongols held—

- (1.) That the establishment of Chinese Administration in Mongolia ;
  - (2.) The presence of Chinese troops ; and
  - (3.) The colonisation of Mongolian territory were incompatible with their rights,
- and that in view of Russia's large interests in Mongolia she could not ignore the *de facto* Government, and that they would enter into business relations with them.

Furthermore, the Russian Government advised Peking that, subject to a recognition of these fundamental rights by China, Russia was willing to act as mediator between it and Mongolia to bring about an agreement between them. No reply having been received from China, Russia decided some months later upon independent action.

In the early part of 1912 the Mongols, replying to Yuan Shih-kai's proclamation of the 26th March, refused to participate in the establishment of a republican form of Government in China; the Russian Government then concluded that the time had come when it could not only secure from the new State the commercial privileges in Mongolia which it had been seeking from China, but also while maintaining its friendly position towards that country, raise up in Outer Mongolia the barrier against the yellow peril, which it looked upon as of such vital importance to the security of its southern frontier. So a convention with the Khalkas embodying these essential principles of Russian policy was determined upon, and in the late autumn of 1911 M. Korostowetz was appointed diplomatic agent to Outer Mongolia, and arrived at Urga to put through the negotiations. He met with considerable difficulty, and had to use pressure and make various promises to attain his end, for the Mongol princes were divided in opinion. Russia wished to confine the new State to Outer Mongolia, whereas many of them wished the new Mongolia defined on purely racial lines. Again, Russia limited her friendly offices to assisting the Mongols to maintain, not an independent State, but simply an autonomous régime. The principal opponent of the treaty was the very intelligent and influential Ta Lama, Tserin-djigmed, Minister of the Interior, who was inclined to seek an arrangement with China, as more likely to prove ultimately beneficial to the Khalkas, but the convention, notwithstanding his opposition, was promptly pushed through and signed on the 3rd November, 1912, coming into force on the same day. The Urga Convention, with its annexed protocol is short and to the point. In consideration of Russia "lending her assistance to Mongolia in preserving the autonomous régime it has established, as well as the right to have her national army and to admit neither the presence of Chinese troops on her territory nor the colonisation of her land by Chinese," the Mongols concede to the Russians the most complete freedom of trade (but no rights of monopoly), "in every kind of product of the soil and industry of Russia, Mongolia, and China." They further promise them the most-favoured-nation treatment, and give them the right to control any treaty arrangements they may wish to enter into later "with the Chinese or another foreign Power" and which may infringe or modify this convention.

The Urga Convention was received in China with howls of disapproval from the noisy "Extremist" politicians then forming the majority of the Parliament in Peking, who clamoured for war with Mongolia and if need be with Russia, as the only proper reply. Russia persisted in asking China to recognise autonomous Mongolia, using the identical terms first stated by her a year previously, though, considering the provision of the Urgan Convention which gives Russia the right of control over Outer Mongolia's treaty relations, the offer of a recognition of the suzerainty of China over it appears utterly meaningless. It was only on the 3rd November, 1913, that after protracted discussion and some indirect pressure on the part of the Russian Minister, M. Krupensky, that he signed with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs a declaration by which Russia recognised Chinese suzerainty over outer Mongolia, while China recognised its autonomy, its exclusive right to settle all questions of a commercial and industrial nature concerning it: Russia pledging herself likewise to send no troops to Mongolia beyond consular guards, nor to intervene in the administration of the country and not to colonise it.

The right to send a Chinese "dignitary" with an escort to reside at Urga "in case of need," and agents to certain localities in Mongolia for the protection of Chinese interests and subjects was also recognised. Finally, China accepted Russian mediation to establish relations with Outer Mongolia in conformity with the provisions of the Urga Convention. Notes exchanged on the same day by the signatories of the declaration stated that as to questions of a political and territorial nature affecting Outer Mongolia the signatory Powers would enter into negotiations, in which the authorities of Outer Mongolia would take part, and it was further stated that autonomous Outer Mongolia included the territories previously under the Ambans at Urga and Kobdo, and the Tartar general at Uliassutai, the limits of these territories to be settled in the negotiations *à trois* previously agreed to. And so once again China bowed to the inevitable.

The majority of the princes and other chiefs of the Khalkas being strong "nationalists," in favour of the complete independence of their country, it was but natural that the Peking declaration should be viewed at Urga with open displeasure. When I was there in December of last year some of the Mongol Ministers frankly declared that, negotiated as it had been over their heads, they absolutely repudiated it. If a remnant of Chinese authority remained they thought it was but a question of time before they would be again under actual Chinese control. For them there were but two alternatives, absolute independence, or annexation to Russia—the latter solution, they said, they liked as little as Chinese suzerainty. To this the Russians replied that the Mongols would take a share on a footing of perfect equality in the negotiations soon to be held at Kiakhta, as provided for by the declaration, and also in all future ones, but the Khalkas know that they are helpless and that, for the time being at least, their fate is sealed, for while Russia for the attainment of her own ends is desirous to keep back the Chinese from Outer Mongolia, she is not desirous to assume the unknown responsibilities which an independent Mongolia would certainly impose upon her.

The responsibilities which Russia has already incurred in Outer Mongolia are great, and the difficulty and importance of permanently establishing her political and commercial supremacy in the country are daily becoming more fully recognised by her.

The Khalkas, it must be borne in mind, are a purely pastoral people, some 700,000\* in number occupying a very extensive territory only suitable for agricultural pursuits in some of the valley bottoms. Outside of a slight knowledge of reading and writing (the reading being nearly entirely confined to religious works) they possess absolutely no education, nor has their form of civilisation advanced at all since the middle of the thirteenth century when they first became known to us, except by the introduction among the well-to-do people of a few domestic articles used and manufactured exclusively by the Chinese and by the present rather general use of stuffs, silk, cotton and woollen of Chinese, foreign, and Thibetan origin, instead of the furs and skins of which they used formerly to make their clothing. The southern Mongols it should be noted, on account of their proximity to and constant intercourse with the Chinese, are much more advanced and self-reliant; education of a sort has made some slight progress among them and they are given, to a certain extent, to the tilling of their lands.

Exclusive of tending their flocks of sheep, their ponies, camels and cattle, the Khalkas know no trade, nor do they care for anything else; easy-going and lazy, they are the most gullible of men. They cannot manufacture a single object used in their simple way of living save an inferior quality of felt and tent frames. Everything else is bought in China or brought to them by the Chinese, even their saddles, bridles, boots, teapots, wooden cups, and numerous other articles come from there. Were it not for the Chinese farmers (mostly from Shantung) who have irrigated in many places the fertile lands of the larger valleys and raise wheat and millet for them they would be reduced to an exclusive diet of meat, butter, milk and cheese.†

With the loose political bonds which hold the tribes together the taxes are paid by the people to their princes, who, while not paying taxes themselves, must hand over a portion of their income to the Hutuketu and to the innumerable rapacious

\* The population of Outer Mongolia seems to have decreased considerably. In the middle of the seventeenth century it was estimated at 600,000 families, or about 3 millions.—Du Halde's "Description de l'Empire de la Chine," iv, 46.

† There are said to be about 20,000 Chinese in Outer Mongolia, 5,000 of whom are in Urga, 2,000 to 3,000 at the Mongolor gold mines in summer. In winter they add to the Chinese population of Mai Mai Chen at Kiakhta.



lamas who swarm in every corner of the land, and another still, until recently, to the Ambans and to the Chinese, with whom they have business relations: for Mongol princes have always been the principal traders of their tribes. All this has effectually prevented the creation of any central Government, if the desire to establish one ever existed, or of a national treasury. Furthermore, the incidence of taxation is everywhere most irregular, and the levying of the taxes always attended with great difficulty. To add to the burden of the Khalka taxpayers, a considerable portion of the population (some persons at Urga told me it might amount to 50,000) are serfs of the Hutuketu, *shabin*, and as such neither pay taxes nor own property of their own, but labour solely tending the numerous flocks and herds of that dignitary. Even the royalties paid by the Russian Mongolor Gold Mining Company went to add to the revenue of two of the princes; there was not at the time of the declaration of Outer Mongolia's independence a single revenue on which it could count.

The financial question was consequently the first which faced the Russians when they "lent their aid" to the Mongols to support their new Government. The simple process had recourse to was making a gift to the Hutuketu's Government of 2,000,000 roubles. The way part of this sum, at least, was promptly expended by the Mongols is an illustration of the state of blissful ignorance of the value of money in which they live. They erected an imposing temple, in which they put a colossal image of the Buddha Maitri of gilt copper and ordered 10,000 small images to place on the walls of the temple around it—9,000 being ordered in Russia at a cost of 144,000 roubles and 1,000 in China at a cost of 36,000 roubles. They have also had made in St. Petersburg at great expense, insignia for an order, the Order of the Vadjir, which has been freely distributed to Russian officials, and in the creation of which foreign suggestion must have played a large part, as decorations were previously unknown among them.

Their first success at raising money encouraged the Mongols to believe that they could get more from the same source, especially as the missions they sent to St. Petersburg to thank the Emperor and his Government for their bounty were received with honour and loaded down with decorations and presents. So they asked for a loan of 3,000,000 of roubles and, pending its being granted, they have tried to make shift with small sums of 10,000 or 20,000 roubles borrowed wherever they could, usually from the Russian Government. Prior to the Declaration of Independence, they had got at odd times considerable sums from the agent of the Chinese bank (Ta Ch'ing Bank) at Urga. When the last Emperor abdicated, the Mongol Minister for Foreign Affairs settled this indebtedness by declaring that, as there was no longer any Ta Ch'ing dynasty the Ta Ch'ing Bank had also ceased to exist and consequently there was no creditor to whom the money was due.

The Russian Government in their first zeal to lend their support to the nascent State, suggested that it would be advisable for the purpose of establishing credit and developing trade, to open a Russian Bank at Urga, where the Russo-Asiatic Bank had some time before closed its doors. The Khalkas began at once to clamour for the bank, such an institution being, according to their views, one which supplied unlimited amounts of ready cash to all comers. They are still clamouring for the bank, but Russian banks seem disinclined to try the venture, though it seems probable that one will be ultimately established there, but the infantile incompetence of the Khalkas in all money matters becoming more and more apparent to all observers, the bank has still to be opened, and the loan is not yet granted. It is generally agreed among well-informed Russians that no large credit or revenue should be made over to the Hutuketu's Government unless there is effective supervision as to its expenditure, and this the Russian Government have pledged themselves not to do by article 3 of the Peking Declaration of the 5th November, 1913.

If the Russian Government is not disposed to bear permanently nearly the total burden of administering Outer Mongolia, sources of revenue must be found in the country, but here again difficulties are numerous. We have referred previously to the disposition made of the direct taxes levied on the people. However small they may be, it seems highly improbable that they can be increased, as the majority are very poor. A source of considerable revenue should be an import tax, but this it would seem is dried up completely at its source, for Russia has free trade in Outer Mongolia "for the products of Russia, Mongolia, and China," and the last named country cannot be expected to accept less favourable treatment; consequently, should a customs duty be imposed on her export trade with Outer Mongolia it seems infinitely probable that she will adopt retaliatory measures. The trade of other foreign nations—unless they can secure directly from Outer Mongolia the same trade privileges as

the Russians enjoy—will be carried on under the Russian flag: one net result is no revenue whatever from any foreign trade.

Suggestions have been made to the Khalkas for raising revenue by taxing liquor and tobacco, levying a poll tax on the Chinese, even the issuing at short intervals of new and attractive postage stamps has not been omitted from these suggestions, but they do not commend themselves to the Mongols, and would probably produce next to nothing. As to oppressing the Chinese, were they driven out of the country, the Khalkas would half starve and have to go unclad.

The royalty paid by the Russian Mongolor Mining Company has become of late a State revenue, and I think probably the principal one, but, though it is 16½ per cent. of the gold extracted, it does not amount to very much, what with the primitive methods of operation and stealing by the miners, the production of these placer mines has fallen off considerably. In 1912 it was 72 poods, or 2,592 English pounds, while last year it fell to 46 poods, or 1,550 pounds. A foreigner offered them last year 1,000,000 roubles a year for the exclusive right to import and sell opium in Outer Mongolia during five years; though they rather liked the idea, the Russians have so far been able to dissuade them from taking such a fatal step.

The flocks and herds of the Khalkas might be increased in numbers and value, and by that means their taxable property would appreciate considerably. But to attain that end the stamping out of rinderpest and the introduction of a finer breed of cattle (of which there seems to be none nearer than Europe) are all needed, and, last but not least, the education of this rather dull people to an appreciation of the value of the measures being taken would have to be brought about, an Herculean task again, but seemingly the only one which may help to develop to any extent Outer Mongolia, whose economic value, I venture to believe, will never greatly rise beyond what it is at present, as long as the Mongols are in possession at all events.

It proved an impossible task to obtain accurate, not to mention full, data as to the value of Outer Mongolia's trade with China and Russia. The trade of Urga, and most, if not all, of the Uliassutai regions, centres in Kiakhta. From the returns of trade for the year 1911, published by a committee of the Merchants' Guild of Kiakhta (this is the latest I have been able to secure, but it is not likely that 1912 and 1913 returns would disclose any very great difference in excess), I find that the total value of Mongol products imported into Russia during that year through Kiakhta was 5,000,000 roubles, or 2,500,000 dollars, while the value of the goods exported to Mongolia from the same place during that period was 1,230,000 roubles, or about 615,000 dollars. The balance in favour of Mongolia, about 1,885,000 dollars, less the value of Russian imports into Mongolia (800,000 roubles), represents approximately the value of the import trade of Outer Mongolia during the same period from China, exclusive, of course, also of that of the trade of Kobdo, which goes to Biisk, and which is certainly not over a third as valuable, say roughly 2,000,000 roubles. That Russia can deflect the bulk of this import trade of Chinese products into Outer Mongolia to her home markets, as some Russian commercial bodies seem to believe feasible, seems under present conditions highly improbable. The trade between Russia and Outer Mongolia is now, as it has been for long years past, a practical monopoly of a few large Russian firms in Kiakhta, all of which have branch houses in China, besides agencies at Urga and Uliassutai. Unmoved by patriotic considerations, they seek to put on the Mongol market the goods most in favour there, and as these happen to be Chinese products, they import them from China via Kalgan, but under the Russian flag, and act simply as consignees or brokers for Chinese houses, thereby reaping a good profit at a minimum outlay of money.

At the present time one of these Kiahta firms controls absolutely navigation of the Selenga River by which the great bulk of the trade of Mongolia via Kiakhta must pass to reach the railroad at Verhnie-Udinsk. Whenever a railway is built to Kiakhta this monopoly will be partly broken down, and Russian products will be more readily offered to the Khalkas, but even at equal prices it is unlikely that they would easily displace the better known and long-used Chinese articles. The importance of at least controlling the tea trade with Outer Mongolia, where tea is not only an indispensable article in the simple diet of the people, but an actual currency, is well known to the Russians, and so they have endeavoured to divert it, at least, from the direct routes via Kalgan and Kuei-hua-ch'eng to the indirect route via the Yang-tsze River to Vladivostock, Verhnie-Udinsk and Kiakhta. This they appear to have done to a certain extent, but at very considerable cost to the Russian Government, which has been obliged to reduce the cost of transportation of tea over the Chinese Eastern Railway to a nominal sum. How long the Government will be willing



to grant such rebates when normal conditions have been re-established in Mongolia, and caravan trade is once more active, remains to be seen, but this experiment shows how put to it the Russian Government find themselves to divert Outer Mongolian trade from its natural channels. No fuller *exposé* of the difficulties which confront Russian economic development in Outer Mongolia, or of the measures the Government have in contemplation for improving it can be found than in the discussion which took place in the Budgetary Commission of the National Duma on the 28th November, 1913. The Minister of Commerce then stated that notwithstanding the efforts heretofore made, Russian trade with Mongolia was still falling off. The organisation and development of this trade was, however, a matter for private enterprise, the Government could only insure favourable conditions. The small sale of Russian goods in Mongolia was due to the very small purchasing capacity of the Mongols, and to the absence of organised credit. The institution of a bank in Mongolia would encourage trade, and the Ministry of Finance was ready to offer its assistance to this end. The cost of railway transportation of goods for the Mongol market had been reduced, and regulations have been made for the granting of customs drawback certificates and establishing a free list. Furthermore, a commercial agency had been established at Urga, but as it had proved itself of limited usefulness, its duties and means of action would be extended (see "Novoe Vremya," the 15 (25) November, 1913).

The various points mentioned by the Minister of Commerce in this discussion have been referred to in previous passage of this paper, and what appear to be real reasons for the unsatisfactory condition of Russian trade in Outer Mongolia have been given, the firmly established preference for Chinese products, and the impossibility for Russian trade (exclusive of that of Kiakhita) to compete on the local markets unless assisted by preferential freight and customs rates are the principal obstacles.

The general conclusion I have reached is that nothing short of the expulsion of most of the present Russian firms and small traders now engaged in the Outer Mongolian trade\* and the substitution of Mongol firms, the exclusion of all possible foreign competition, together with the maintenance of preferential treatment for home trade and the forcing of all Chinese imports to come by the Vladivostock-Verkhne-Udinsk Kiakhita route, can secure to Russia the economic control of Outer Mongolia. With the right for this country to concede equally favourable trade conditions to other nationalities, and the practical impossibility of excluding Chinese goods from the direct route the task seems quite an impossible one.

Certain measures have quite recently been suggested in Russia by persons and organisations taking interest in the question of Outer Mongolian trade for the betterment of economic conditions there. One urges the improvement of the roads and waterways, another, the Irkutsk Chamber of Commerce, advises the free entry into Russia of Mongolian products, the organisation of a veterinary service in Mongolia to combat the rinderpest, and the establishment of Russian telegraph stations and post offices. None of these measures, except the organisation of a larger veterinary service (one already exists) would appear likely to serve or in any way benefit the Mongols, or extend Russian economic control over the country.

The best Russian work on Russo-Mongol trade is, according to all Russians, as well as men of business in Siberia and Mongolia when questioned on the subject, that published in 1910 by Bogoleipof and Sobolef, entitled "Očerki Russko-Mongoliskoi Torgovli," or "Outlines of Russo-Mongol Trade." The conclusion reached by these writers after careful study in Mongolia and Siberia of this matter is given in chapter xx of their work (pp. 474-490). They accept the fact of the steady falling off of Russian import trade into Mongolia, and of the futility of hoping to drive out Chinese competition, even if all the measures advocated by the Russian Government, commercial organisations and individuals are carried through. They condemn the substitution of constant Governmental assistance in fostering and developing this trade, while attempting at the same time to maintain the general high cost of production of Russian goods. Individual initiative and enterprise, with which the Chinese engaged in Mongol trade are well supplied, is, in their opinion, the only hope for bettering the situation.

"The extension of Russo-Mongol trade shows how necessary it is for the individual as well as the nation to seek their power and strength within themselves. Russia turned to the East in the hope that her higher civilisation would open a market

\* There are said to be in Urga 1,000 Russian subjects—exclusive, of course, of civil officials and the agency escort—a considerable portion of whom are, I believe, Buriat Mongols. At the Mongol gold mines there are said to be in the working season some 2,000 to 3,000 Russians.

to her industry. She could not possibly expect to find a market for that industry in the West, but in the East Russian goods have appeared in the same manner as Russian industry exists within Russia, to wit, under strong escort. Within Russia industry is escorted by customs duty, by preferential tariffs, by loans and supports. In the Far East the Russian merchant was always preceded by the soldier's bayonet, by concessions, privileges, special treaties, and large expenditure of Government gold. Only in Mongolia has Russia appeared first on an outside market without this escort. Here she was for the first time seen advancing in a purely commercial way. Russia's right of duty free trade in Mongolia was counterbalanced by the competition of lower priced English and American goods, and by the fact that the trade has, up till now, to count with considerable difficulties of conveyance and the primitive conditions of Mongol life. The result of this trial of open competition in a foreign market has, we much regret to say, given proof that we are not yet strong enough to maintain a purely economical position."

The remedies advocated by the writers are :—

1. The creation of a buffer State in Northern Mongolia;
2. The stopping of Chinese colonisation, "a danger not only to the Mongols, but to the white races"; and
3. The organisation of Russian trade, the principal factor of which should be the cheapening of Russian goods on the Mongol market, so that they can compete with those sold by the Chinese.

In urging these measures the writers seem to have lost sight of their previous contention that Governmental assistance could never take the place of individual initiative, but they foreshadow correctly the policy which has since then been followed by the Russian Government.

The only way out of the difficulty of maintaining an autonomous Outer Mongolia, subject to the conditions laid down in the Urga Convention and the Peking Declaration, would seem to lie in the direction of establishing a complete and hearty co-operation to that end between Russia and China for its administrative and economic development. This should include a willingness on the part of these two countries to allow the establishment of a low tariff of duties, say, 5 per cent., or even 3 per cent., on all imports into the country, the customs service to be, if possible, under foreign management. This would give a certain small revenue to the Government at Urga, which, added to the sums it will probably continue to receive from gold mining, timber felling rights, and various other concessions, and the ordinary taxes in force in the country should, with economy and honesty (two very difficult things to obtain, however), prove sufficient for their simple administrative needs, including even the maintenance of the small native Cossack brigade now being organised under Russian officers, if it is not increased beyond its present force of 1,500 men. If some such arrangement is not arrived at, the alternative seems to be the financing of Outer Mongolia by Russia.

So far the assistance the Russian Government has given the Khalkas has been mainly, if not exclusively, confined to Urga. The first step was the organisation of a small force to police the country. The Urga Government showed themselves disinclined to see it undertaken, and opposed apathy and childish objections, and it was not without some difficulty and the promise of ample assistance to carry out the scheme that it was finally agreed to. In May or June 1913 a small Russian military mission arrived, and having established a permanent camp at a place called Hujir-burun, about five miles east of Urga, began the recruiting and instruction of a small force of cavalry, the equipment, arms, ammunition and six light mountain guns being also presented by the Russian Government.

They have also opened a small hospital, equipped the "Russo-Mongol printing office," where a bi-monthly paper, the first of its kind, called the "Shiné toli khémehu bitchik," or "New Mirror," is printed in Mongol, but it finds very few readers. A contract has been made with an enterprising Russian to open a service of motor buses between Urga and Kiakhta, he assuming the charge of repairing (practically remaking) the 170 odd miles of bad road between these two places. It seems probable that some time will elapse before this service is opened. A small school has been established (it has not over ten pupils) in which to teach the Khalkas Russian. Furthermore, nine promising Khalka boys have been placed in school in Irkutsk and about the like number at Troitskosarsk or Kiakhta.



The old Russian concession in the Mongol town of Urga being inadequate, a much larger one of 270 desiatines has been granted the Russian Government between that town and Mai Mai Chen, and including in it the diplomatic agency and other official buildings. Here two or three Moscow merchants have been induced to buy lots of ground, around them high palisade fences have been put, but on them no building will ever be placed. A diminutive police force (six cossacks of the escort of the agency) has lately been put on duty in the old Russian concession, and an enterprising Russian trader has started a cinematograph. Such were the principal signs of Russian governmental and private activity at Urga when I was there last December. Among the Khalkas their new gained liberty has not caused an awakening of any dormant energy. The Hutuketu's Government have confined their activities to starting a little school in which to teach Russian, and the Ministry of War has "under consideration" the building of a prison to take the place of the horrible palisaded enclosure in which malefactors are now confined and, if reports are true, most cruelly treated. Public works of any kind (the filth in Urga is indescribable, the dead are frequently thrown by the wayside to be devoured by the herds of dogs which swarm over the whole place) will have to wait for money to come into the coffers of the State, till then at all events, nothing can or will be done—afterwards it will probably be as before.

A number of very serious questions confront the Khalkas, one of which, at all events, must promptly be solved. There are absolutely no fundamental laws for the organisation or administration of the new confederacy. The question of the succession of the rulership has not been taken up even. Nothing has been done to strengthen the former loose organisation of the country in which Chinese authority could always be appealed to, and was always forthcoming, to guide or control their views or actions.

Although, to use the language of the Urga Convention, it was "in accordance with the desire unanimously expressed by the Mongols to maintain the national and historic constitution of their country that the Jebtsum-damba Hutuketu was proclaimed ruler of the Mongol people," nevertheless this choice does not appear to have coincided with the unanimous wish of the various princes and chiefs, many of whom hoped that a ruler of their own race and a member of their ancient nobility might found a dynasty to rule over them. Agitation in favour of this nationalist solution of the dynastic question became strong during the last year, and the Sain Noyin Khan, the actual President of the Council of Ministers, was considered the strongest, noblest and most popular ruler the country could have to establish the new Mongol empire.

On the other hand, the Hutuketu, or as he is now styled, the Bogdo Khan or "Holy Prince," though a lama, is married, has sons (his brother, the Ta Lama, is also blessed with children), and hopes to establish his dynasty. While the Russian Government lends him their support for the time being, it can hardly be doubted that they would see with no particular concern the substitution of a manly, intelligent, though inexperienced Mongol Prince in the place of the notoriously debauched Thibetan lama. Besides his personal unfitness there is another reason for apprehension if the Hutuketu is maintained in power, which is his well-known ambition (the first Hutuketu as we have noted previously had the same ambition) to create an independent lamaist Church in Mongolia. Any attempt to carry it out would most likely create serious internal dissensions, for the authority of the supreme Head of the Yellow Church, the Talai Lama of Thibet, is everywhere recognised in Mongolia, and it could not be easily put aside, although the severance of Outer Mongolia's relation with China may enable the Hutuketu to fill all ecclesiastical offices with his creatures, such offices being no longer, as heretofore, under the control of the Government at Peking.

There are other questions, both of a political and economic nature, which must cause the well-wishers of the new State grave apprehension, but enough has been said, it is thought, to justify my belief in the wisdom of the present policy of a minimum of interference on the part of the Russian Government in the affairs of Outer Mongolia, so long as the cardinal principles of their defensive policy in the Far East are fully recognised by all interested Powers. The strict enforcement of these principles may, some day, carry Russia much further than she desires, but until there is another general reversal of her policy in Far Eastern Asia it seems unlikely; things in Outer Mongolia will go on much as before.

As I finish writing I have received a copy of the very recently published work of Mr. Douglas Carruthers, entitled "Unknown Mongolia." In a most instructive chapter dealing with Mongolia, past and present, the writer, speaking of the session and the establishment of the autonomous Government says (I, 315-317) that:—

"Taking for granted an autonomous Mongolia under the protection of Russia, we can prophecy far-reaching and fundamental changes in the lives of the people, and in the future of the Mongol race. Mongolia will become, indeed, probably has already become, a land of activity and progress instead of, as formerly, a land of stagnation and suppression. Russian merchants will flock into the country, railways will be constructed, vacant lands will be used for agricultural purposes, and waste land reclaimed. There will be facilities for trade, which will prove advantageous to the Mongols as well as the Russians. . . . Foreigners will work gold reefs, with the result that Chinese suzerainty and the Church will lose no small amount of prestige. With this new movement and activity the old lethargy will no doubt decrease, and, we hope, eventually disappear."

This prophecy may some day in the far future be partly realised, but I can see no sign of such a consummation, and I must rather agree with Mr. Carruthers's other statement in the Introduction (p. 9) to his work, viz., "Who would dare to prophecy the future of the marches of Siberia and China?"

W. W. ROCKHILL.

*Peking, February 10, 1914.*



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Peking.

No. 124. Confidential.

March 23, 1914.

Copy to India & Tokio.

*Print  
above*

Sir,

Memorandum

I have the honour to transmit to you  
herewith a Memorandum on the present situation in  
Outer Mongolia which has been communicated to me by  
Mr. W. W. Rockhill, at one time United States Minister  
to China.

Mr. Rockhill, who is a recognised authority on Far Eastern questions, arrived in Peking a few months ago after a journey across Mongolia where he had an opportunity of confirming his impressions by personal observation.

The Memorandum enclosed herein reviews the relations between China, Mongolia and Russia during the past few years and shows how the latter Power has been compelled by the force of events and the weakness of China to gradually replace <sup>a defensive</sup> by a forward

The Right Honourable

policy

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., K.G., M.P.,

etc.      etc.      etc.

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policy in order to safeguard her interests in the regions which have been specially allotted to her influence by her agreements with Japan and by the tacit acquiescence of other foreign Governments.

Mr. Rockhill's information concerning the relatively unimportant position held by Russian merchants in Mongolian trade bears out the reports previously forwarded to you from this Legation. He also indicates the difficulties in the way of the financial and administrative organisation of an autonomous Outer Mongolia.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

(signed) J. N. Jordan.



# THE QUESTION OF OUTER MONGOLIA

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Mr W.W. ROCKHILL.

The reversal of Russian policy which followed the termination of the war with Japan was caused, not only by a realisation of that country's military power, but also ~~next~~ by the manifest signs that China was adopting a forward policy and that her successful assertion of her rights of sovereignty over her outlying dependencies, Mongolia and Tibet, and her possible ulterior political union with Japan, would expose the ~~partially~~ sparsely peopled and very imperfectly developed far-eastern provinces of the Russian Empire to the pacific encroachments and their possible ultimate economic subjugation by the Yellow races - the Jews of the East.

Henceforth the dominant idea of Russian policy became the salvation at all costs of the provinces east of the Baikal from the Yellow Peril, and the building up in them of a strong, homogenous, Slav bulwark, which could successfully resist its insidious attacks. In order to attain this end and to rid herself of this obsession, Russia has not hesitated within the last few years to sacrifice substantial interests, and to pour out vast sums of money in the maintenance of her position in her far eastern provinces and Northern Manchuria. She has concluded a series of conventions and agreements with Japan conceding her various valuable rights and gaining only in return a sense of greater security for the future. She has seriously retarded the development of her Pri-Amur Provinces, into which the Russian Immigrants come reluctantly at best, ~~has~~ by the passage of laws against yellow labour, and has discriminated against Northern Manchurian trade generally, but her efforts to increase thereby Russian colonisation, agricultural development and the supply of white labour in these regions, have had but the smallest modicum of success. Finally she has been led to adopt a forward policy in Northern Mongolia and to attempt to create there a buffer state, in the hope of arresting in that direction the peaceful penetration of the dreaded Chinese.

Russia's ~~is~~ action in Mongolia is without doubt purely  
defensive

defensive: begun with hesitation, it has been followed with <sup>some</sup> misgivings, but in all its stages it has been, as I hope to show in this paper, in perfect conformity with the general policy in Eastern Asia pursued for the last six years, and which is based on the profound and general belief among all classes in the Yellow Peril.

The historical and political side of the question of Outer Mongolia is briefly as follows: In the latter part of the 14th century the Khalka Mongols, driven from Southern Mongolia by the first Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, took up the country they now occupy, and which lies south of Siberia from Kobdo on the west to near Hsi Lung-chiang on the east. They led an independent existence until the latter part of the 17th century, when a war broke out between them and their powerful neighbours, the Oelot Mongols, in which they were defeated and driven to seek the aid of the Chinese. The great Kang Hsi was then on the throne of China. In 1691 he called a great durbar of the Khalkas at Dolor in south eastern Mongolia and there the princes of outer Mongolia gave in their submission to China and accepted vassalage. Very recent Russian writers have asserted that on this occasion the Khalkas only accepted Chinese suzerainty on three conditions, ~~to wit~~ i) that their country should not be colonised by Chinese; (ii) that no Chinese troops should be stationed within it, and (iii) that their internal organisation and customs should be respected.

I have not been able after careful search to find any ~~Chinese~~ contemporary Chinese or foreign document which bears out this assertion, and I am inclined to doubt its accuracy. du Halde (Description IV, 53) quoting, presumably from the writings of Father Gerbillon who was present at the great durbar of 1691, says "And so this war (with the Oelots) was ended to the glory of the Emperor, who, has become the absolute master of the whole Empire of the Khalkas and of the Eluths, and has extended his dominion in Tartary to the confines of the Muscovites, which are for the most part bare and uninhabited forests and mountains". The Khalkas

have



have, however, claimed, at least in the preamble to the Urga Convention, if in no other official document, that the recent violation<sup>n</sup> by China of these terms was the principal cause of their secession.

One of the principal<sup>al</sup> instigators, if not the chief one, of this unfortunate war was a Mongol Lama, the brother of one of the most powerful princes of the Khalkas. He had been appointed, by the Dalai Lama of Tibet, the Head of the Buddhist Church in Outer Mongolia, and he bore the title of Jebtsun-damba Hutuketu. Shortly after his installation in 1650 he sought to create a schism in the church, and he had himself recognised as temporal ruler of the country. He was the first of the line of theocrats, all bearing the same title<sup>as</sup> he, which has since then practically ruled over the Confederation of Khalka Tribes.

In the middle of the 18th century the then Hutuketu established his residence at the foot of a sacred mountain called the Bogdo ula, which may be the burying place of Gengis Khan, and along the base of which flows the Tula river, an affluent of the Selenga. Near by a lamasery, called Galan was founded, ~~and~~ and around ~~it~~ it grew up the present town of Urga, Iké Kuré, or Ta Ku-lun, as it is variously called, and which remains the only city of outer Mongolia, though it ill deserves the name, notwithstanding its 30,000 odd~~x~~ inhabitants, of whom<sup>probably</sup> a third are lamas.

The first Hutuketu dying in 1724, was succeeded by another Mongol, but as he continued the separatist intrigues of his predecessor, causing thereby internal dissensions, the Chinese ~~Government~~ Government decided in 1754 that the secular affairs of the country should be managed by a body of laymen, over which, shortly after, a Mongol Governor was appointed as President. In 1757 the second Hutuketu dying, it was decided by China that his successor should be a Tibetan, whose appoint<sup>n</sup>ment should be confirmed by Peking, and further to ensure the submission of the Khalka tribes, a Manchu Resident or Amban, with a small escort, was sent to Urga in 1761, and a Tartar general to Uliassutai. Such has been substantially till

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till the year 1912 the organisation of outer Mongolia; the 86 Khosun or "Banners" forming the 4 Aimak, or "Tribes", of the Khalkas enjoyed practically autonomous government, subject only to certain light charges and to minor restrictions on their general liberty of government, and without the presence of any Chinese troops within their confines, though Chinese traders and farmers have probably always been welcomed among them, at all events they have never been molested.

Shortly after the Khalkas took up their abode in the region confining on Siberia, the Russians entered into trade relations with them, first from the town of Selenginsk, which was founded in 1666, and later on (from 1727) from Kiakhta, on the frontier between the two countries.

It was only in 1860, however, that Russia obtained by the Treaty of Peking (Art V) the right to establish a consulate at Urga and that Kalgan on the southern border of Mongolia was opened to her trade. Shortly after the present Russian Consulate was built to the east of Urga, between it and the Chinese trading town of Maimaichen, and a Russian Buriat Mongol, Shishmarew by name was appointed to fill the post. This he did for nearly 50 years, his successor having only been appointed in or about 1908.

In 1869 Russia and China signed a further convention at Peking for the land trade between the two countries. Article I provided for a freetrade zone of 100 li (30 miles) in the two countries along the whole of their frontiers, while Article II stated that "Russian merchants shall be at liberty to proceed to all parts of Mongolia - for the purposes of trade, and shall likewise be exempt from the levy of duty". This franchise (the Chinese always sought to limit it) accorded Russian trade in Mongolia was reaffirmed in 1881 in the Treaty of St Petersburg, Article XII, with the proviso however that "this immunity shall cease when the development of trade shall necessitate the fixing of a customs tariff after agreement between the two Governments".

Article



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Article XV of the same Treaty provided for a decennial revision of this instrument~~x~~ if one of the contracting parties gave notice six months before the expiry of the term, so in 1910 Russia gave notice to China of her desire to negotiate a revision, in the hope of securing a further extension of the free trade enjoyed by her in Mongolia, which alone enabled her traders to compete there with the Chinese. The Chinese Government was then in the full flush of their "rights recovery policy", and intent on nothing less than the absorption of Mongolia, the New Dominion and Tibet, and their transformation into ordinary provinces of the Empire, with the consequent establishment of Chinese administration, an influx of Chinese emigration, and (in the case of Mongolia) its occupation by the military forces of the Empire, with, of course, the application of the General Customs Tariff, in which measures Russia saw great peril to her thinly populated border lands and the destruction of her trade.

The establishment of a considerable Chinese <sup>military</sup> ~~military~~ force at Sharasume on the Russian frontier west of Koodo, coupled with the impolitic activity of the Urga Amban, San Tao, who began ~~in~~ erecting barr<sup>a</sup>cks for troops, taking steps to enrol the Mongols, browbeating the Hutuketu, the princes, and the people and otherwise showing the lamentable lack of tact and discretion which is a marked feature of the "Young China" Reformer : all this confirmed the Russians in their apprehension of Chinese aggression along the whole line of their frontier. The dilatoriness of Peking in replying to, Russia's request for treaty revision was an additional source of irritation to the Government of S. Petersburg, and so in the winter of 1910-1911 a small body of troops was concentrated at Semipalatinsk to counteract~~x~~ the presence of the Chinese at Sharasume, and shortly after, in March 1911, a peremptory demand was sent to Peking asking the confirmation of Russia's rights under the treaty of 1881. To this China made no definite reply and the matter remained in suspense <sup>while</sup> ~~until~~ unrest grew in Outer Mongolia. Provoked

by

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San Tao's stupidity, by the rising revolution against the Manchus, and undoubtedly relying on eventual Russian support as Russia had so frequently of late years announced her "special interest in Mongolia", the Khalkas, on the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, expelled the Amban and on December 29 1911 declared the severance of all political ties with China, and chose as their ruler the present profligate Jebtsun-damba Hutuketu, the eighth successor of him who had brought about the subjection of the Khalkas to the Manchu rule.

There can be little doubt but that the Russians must have viewed with real satisfaction the secession of Outer Mongolia, for it supplied them with the means of preventing further Chinese pressure on their borders and of permanently securing the trade privileges they claimed under the treaty of 1881 while running little danger of embroiling themselves seriously with China, with whom they desired to remain if possible on the best of terms. **XL**

It cannot be denied that the Mongols had good grounds for wishing to put an end to their political relations with China. Their oppression by the officials sent among them was notorious, and it has been acknowledged by the present Government of China. The charge of official malfeasance could not be more strongly put than by Yuan Shih-kai in his proclamation to the Mongols and Tibetans of March 26, 1912. "In recent years," he says, "the high officials sent to those border lands have been worthless, all have been most overbearing, there has not been a single one who has endeavoured to put an end to the deception and cruel oppression practiced on these peoples. So hostility to China has been aroused every where and discontent has grown general. A source of deep sorrow indeed".

There appears good reason for believing that when the idea of secession was made known to the Russian Government by the unofficial mission which came to St. Petersburg in the summer of 1911, very little encouragement was actually given it at the Foreign Office and, though the then Russian Minister at Peking, Mr. Korostowetz, professed the most friendly feelings for the Mongols whom he thought should be helped, and so advised his Government, the Foreign Minister only tendered the mission his unofficial good offices with China. But immediately after the Mongol Declaration



Declaration of Independence, the Russian Government announced that the Mongols held (1) that the establishment of Chinese Administration in Mongolia (2) the presence of Chinese troops and (3) the colonisation of Mongolian territory, were incompatible with their rights and that in view of Russia's large interests in Mongolia she could not ignore the de facto Government, and that they would enter into business relations with them. Furthermore the Russian Government advised Peking that, subject to a recognition of these fundamental rights by China, Russia was willing to act as mediator between it and Mongolia to bring about an agreement between them. No reply having been received from China, Russia decided some months later upon independent action.

In the

In the early part of 1912, the Mongols, replying to Yuan Shih Kai's proclamation of March 26th, refused to participate in the establishment of a republican form of Government in China: the Russian Government then concluded<sup>k</sup> that the time had come when it could not only secure from the new state the commercial privileges in Mongolia which it had been seeking from China, but also while maintaining its friendly position towards that country, raise up in Outer Mongolia the barrier against the yellow peril which it looked upon as of such vital importance to the security of its southern frontier. So a convention with the Khalkas embodying these essential principles of Russian policy was determined upon, and in the late autumn of 1911 Mr Korostowetz was appointed Diplomatic Agent to Outer Mongolia and arrived at Urga to put through the negotiations. He met with considerable difficulty, and had to use pressure and make various promises to <sup>5</sup> attain his end, for the Mongol princes were divided in opinion. Russia~~d~~ wished to confine the new state to Outer Mongolia, whereas many of them wished the new Mongolia defined on purely racial lines. Again, Russia limited her friendly offices to assisting the Mongols to maintain, not an independent state, but simply an autonomous regime. The principal opponent of the treaty was the very intelligent and influential Ta Lama, Tserin-gjigmed, Minister of the Interior, who was inclined to seek an arrangement with China, as more likely to prove ultimately beneficial to the Khalkas, but the <sup>convention</sup> ~~convention~~, notwithstanding his opposition, was promptly pushed through and signed on November 3rd. 1912, coming into force on the same day. The Urga Convention, with its annexed



annexed Protocol, is short and to the point: in consideration of Russia "lending her assistance to Mongolia in preserving the autonomous régime it has established, as well as the right to have her national army and to admit neither the presence of Chinese troops on her territory nor the colonisation of her land by Chinese", the Mongols concede to the Russians the most complete freedom of trade (but no rights of monopoly)"in every kind of product of the soil and industry of Russia, Mongolia and China". They further promise them the most favoured nation treatment, and give them the right to control any treaty arrangements they may wish to enter into later "with the Chinese or another foreign Power" and which may infringe or modify this convention.

The Urga Convention was received in China with howls of disapproval from the noisy "extremist" politicians then forming the majority of the Parliament in Peking, who clamoured for war with Mongolia and if need be with Russia, as the only proper <sup>reply</sup> ~~way~~. Russia persisted in asking China to recognise autonomous Mongolia, using the identical terms first stated by her a year previously, though, considering the provision of the Urga Convention which gives Russia the right of control over Outer Mongolia's treaty relations, the offer of a recognition of the suzerainty of China over it appears utterly meaningless. It was only on November 3rd, 1913, that after protracted discussion and some indirect pressure on the part of the Russian Minister, Mr Krupensky, that he signed with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, a Declaration, by which Russia recognised Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia, while China recognised its autonomy, its

exclusive right to settle all questions of a commercial and industrial nature concerning it: Russia pledging herself likewise to send no troops to Mongolia beyond consular guards, nor to intervene in the administration of the country and not to colonise it.

The right to send a Chinese "Dignitary" with an escort to reside at Urga "in case of need", and agents to certain localities in Mongolia for the protection of Chinese interests and subjects was also recognised. Finally, China accepted ~~XXXX~~ Russian mediation to establish relations with outer Mongolia in conformity with the provisions of the Urga Convention. Notes exchanged on the same day by the signatories of the Declaration stated that as to questions of a political and territorial nature affecting Outer Mongolia the signatory powers would enter into negotiations, in which the authorities of Outer Mongolia would take part, and it was further stated that autonomous outer Mongolia included the territories previously under the Ambans at Urga and Kobdo, and the Tartar general at Uliassutai, the limits of these territories to be settled in the negotiations à trois previously agreed to. And so once again China bowed to the inevitable.

The majority of the princes and other chiefs of the Khalkas being strong "Nationalists", in favour of the complete independence of their country, it was but natural that the Peking Declaration should be viewed at Urga with open displeasure. When I was there in December of last year some of the mongol Ministers frankly declared that, negotiated as it had been over their heads, they absolutely repudiated it. If a remnant of Chinese authority remained they thought it was but a question of time before they would be again under actual Chinese control. ~~It~~ For them there were but two alternatives, absolute independence or annexation to Russia - the latter solution, they said, they liked as little as Chinese ~~suzerainty~~ suzerainty. To this the Russians replied that the Mongols would take a share on a footing



footing of perfect equality in the negotiations soon to be held at KM Kiakhta, as provided for by the Declaration, and also in all future ones, but the Khalkas know that they are helpless and that, for the time being at least, their fate is sealed, for while Russia for the attainment of her own ends is desirous to ~~to~~ keep back the Chinese from Outer Mongolia, she is not desirous to assume the unknown responsibilities which an independent Mongolia would certainly impose upon her.

The responsibilities which Russia has already incurred in Outer Mongolia are great, and the difficulty and importance of permanently establishing her political and commercial supremacy in the country are daily becoming more fully recognised by her.

The Khalkas, it must be borne in mind, are a purely pastoral people, some 700,000 in number, occupying a very extensive territory only suitable for agricultural pursuits in some of the valley bottoms. Outside of a slight knowledge of reading and writing (the reading being nearly entirely confined to religious works) they possess absolutely no education, nor has their form of civilisation advanced at all since the middle of the 13th century when they first became known to us, except by the introduction among the well-to-do people of a few domestic articles used and manufactured exclusively by the Chinese, and by the present rather general use of stuffs, silk cotton and woolen of Chinese foreign and Tibetan origin, instead of the furs and skins of which they used formerly to make their clothing. The southern Mongols it should be noted, on account of their proximity to and constant intercourse with the Chinese, are much more advanced and self-reliant; education of a sort has made some slight progress among them and they are given, to a certain extent, to the tilling of ~~in~~ their lands.

Exclusive of tending their flocks of sheep, their ponies, camels and cattle, the Khalkas know no trade, nor do they care for anything else; easy-going and lazy, they are the most gullible of

The population of Outer Mongolia seems to have decreased considerably. In the middle of the 17 century it was estimated at 600,000 families or about 3 millions. Du Halde "Description de l'Empire de la Chine" IV 46.

of men They cannot manufacture a single object used in their simple way of living save an inferior quality of felt and tent frames. Everything else is bought in China or brought to them by the Chinese, even their saddles, bridles, boots, teapots, woodencups and numerous other articles come from there. Were it not for

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the Chinese farmers (mostly from Shantung) who have irrigated in many places the fertile lands of the larger valleys and raise wheat and millet for them, they would be reduced to an exclusive diet of meat, butter, milk and cheese.<sup>1</sup>

With the loose political bonds which hold the tribes together the taxes are paid by the people to their princes, who, while not paying taxes themselves must hand over a portion of their income to the Hutuketu and to the innumerable rapacious lamas who swarm in every corner of the land, and another still, until recently, to the Ambans and to the Chinese, with whom they have business relations: for Mongol princes have always been the principal traders of their tribes. All this has effectually prevented the creation of any central government, if the desire to establish one ever existed, or of a national treasury. Furthermore, the incidence of taxation is everywhere most irregular, and the levying of the taxes always attended with great difficulty. To add to the burden of the Khalka taxpayers a considerable portion of the population (some persons at Urga told me it might amount to 50,000) are serfs of the Hutuketu, shabin, and as such neither pay taxes nor own property of their own, but labour solely tending the numerous flocks and herds of that dignitary. Even the royalties paid by the Russian Mongolor gold mining company went to add to the revenue of two of the princes: there was not at the time of the Declaration of Outer Mongolia's Independence, a single revenue on which it could count.

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<sup>1</sup>There are said to be about 20,000 Chinese in Outer Mongolia, 5,000 of whom are in Urga, 2,000 to 3,000 at the Mongolor Gold mines in summer - in winter they add to the Chinese population of Kai Lai Chen at Kiakhta.

The financial question was consequently the first which faced the Russians when they "lent their aid" to the Mongols to support their new government. The simple process had recourse to was making a gift to the Hutuketu's government of two million roubles. The way part of this sum, at least, was promptly expended by the Mongols is an illustration of the state of blissful ignorance of the value of money in which they live. They erected an imposing temple, in which they put a colossal image of the Buddha Vaitri of gilt copper and ordered ten thousand small images to place on the walls of the temple around it: nine thousand being ordered in Russia at a cost of Rbles 144,000 and one thousand in China at a cost of Rbls 36,000. They have also had made in St. Petersburg at great expense insignia for an order, the Order of the Vadjir, which has been freely distributed to Russian officials, and in the creation of which foreign suggestion must have played a large part, as decorations were previously unknown among them.

Their first success at raising money encouraged the Mongols to believe that they could get more from the same source, especially as the missions they sent to St. Petersburg to thank the Emperor and his government for their bounty were received with honour and loaded down with decorations and presents. So they asked for a loan of 3,000,000 of roubles and, pending its being granted, they have tried to make shift with small sums of ten or twenty thousand roubles borrowed wherever they could, usually from the Russian government. Prior to the Declaration of Independence they had got at odd times

considerable



considerable sums from the agent of the Chinese bank (Ta Ch'ing Bank) at Urga. When the <sup>last</sup> Emperor abdicated, the Mongol Minister for Foreign Affairs settled this indebtedness by declaring that, as there was no longer any Ta Ch'ing dynasty the Ta Ch'ing Bank had also ceased to exist and consequently there was no creditor to whom the money was due.

The Russian government in their first zeal to lend their support to the nascent state suggested that it would be advisable for the purpose of establishing credit and developing trade, to open a Russian bank at Urga, where the Russo-Asiatic Bank had sometime before closed its doors. The Khalkas began at once to clamour for the bank, such an institution being according to their views, one which supplied unlimited amounts of ready cash to all comers. They are still clamouring for the bank, but Russian banks seem disinclined to try the venture, though it seems probable that one will be ultimately established there, but the infantile incompetence of the Khalkas in all money matters becoming more and more apparent to all observers the bank has still to be opened, and the loan is not yet granted. It is generally agreed among well-informed Russians that no large credit or revenue should be made over to the Hutuketu's government unless there is effective supervision as to its expenditure, and this the Russian Government have pledged themselves not to do by Article III of the Peking Declaration of November 5th 1913.

If the Russian Government is not disposed to bear permanently nearly the total burden of administering Outer Mongolia, sources of revenue must be found in the country:

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but here again difficulties are numerous. We have referred previously to the disposition made of the direct taxes levied on the people. However small they may be, it seems highly improbable that they can be increased, as the majority are very poor. A source of considerable revenue should be an import tax, but this it would seem is dried up completely at its source, for Russia has free trade in Outer Mongolia "for the products of Russia, Mongolia and China" and the last named country cannot be expected to accept less favourable treatment: consequently should a customs duty be imposed on her export trade with Outer Mongolia it seems infinitely probable that she will adopt retaliatory measures. The trade of other foreign nations - unless they can secure directly from Outer Mongolia the same trade privileges as the Russians enjoy - will be carried on under the Russian flag: the net result is no revenue whatever from any foreign trade.

Suggestions have been made to the Khalkas for raising revenue by taxing liquor and tobacco: levying a poll tax on the Chinese: even the issuing at short intervals of new and attractive postage stamps has not been omitted from these suggestions, but they do not commend themselves to the Mongols, and would probably produce next to nothing. As to oppressing the Chinese, were they driven out of the country, the Khalkas would half starve and have to go unclad.

The royalty paid by the Russian Mongolor mining company has become of late a state revenue, and I think probably the principal one, but, though it is 10% of the gold extracted, it does not amount to very much: what

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with the primitive methods of operation and stealing by the miners, the production of these placer mines has fallen off considerably. In 1912 it was 72 poods or 2592 English pounds, while last year it fell to 46 poods or 1850 pounds. A foreigner offered them last year a million roubles a year for the exclusive right to import and sell opium in Outer Mongolia during five years: though they rather liked the idea the Russians have so far been able to dissuade them from taking such a fatal step.

The flocks and herds of the Khalkas might be increased in numbers and value, and by that means their taxable property would appreciate considerably. But to attain that end time, the stamping out of rinderpest and the introduction of a finer breed of cattle (of which there seems to be none nearer than Europe) are all needed, and, last but not least, the education of this rather dull people to an appreciation of the value of the measures being taken would have to be brought about, an Herculean task again, but seemingly the only one which may help to develop to any extent Outer Mongolia, whose economic value, I venture to believe, will never greatly rise beyond what it is at present, as long as the Mongols are in possession at all events.

It proved an impossible task to obtain accurate, not to mention full, data as to the value of Outer Mongolia's trade with China and Russia. The trade of Urga, and most if not all of the Uliassutai regions centres in Kiakhta. From the returns of Trade for the year 1911, published by a Committee of the Merchants' Guild of Kiakhta (this is the latest I have been able to secure, but it is not likely that 1912 and 1913 returns would disclose any very great difference in excess), I find that the total value  
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of Mongol products imported into Russia during that year through Kiakhta was five millions of roubles, or 2½ million dollars, while the value of the goods exported to Mongolia from the same place during that period was Rbls. 1,230,000 or about 615,000 dollars. The balance in favour of Mongolia, about 1,885,000 dollars, less the value of Russian imports into Mongolia (Rbls. 800,000) represents approximately the value of the import trade of Outer Mongolia during the same period from China, exclusive of course also of that of the trade of Kobdo, which goes to Biisk, and which is certainly not over a third as valuable, say roughly two millions of roubles. That Russia can deflect the bulk of this import trade of Chinese products into Outer Mongolia to her home markets, as some Russian commercial bodies seem to believe feasible, seems under present conditions highly improbable. The trade between Russian and Outer Mongolia is now, as it has been for long years past, a practical monopoly of a few large Russian firms in Kiakhta, all of which have branch houses in China besides agencies at Urga and Uliassutai. Unmoved by patriotic considerations they seek to put on the Mongol markets the goods most in favour there, and as these happen to be Chinese products they import them from China via Kulgan but under the Russian flag, and act simply as consignees or brokers for Chinese houses, thereby reaping a good profit at a minimum outlay of money.

At the present time one of these Kiakhta firms controls absolutely navigation of the Selenga river by which the great bulk of the trade of Mongolia via Kiakhta must pass to reach the railroad at Verkhnie-Udinsk. Whenever a railway is built to Kiakhta this monopoly will be partly broken down and Russian products will be more readily

offered



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offered to the Khalkas, but even at equal prices it is unlikely that they would easily displace the better known and long-used Chinese articles. The importance of at least controlling the tea trade with Outer Mongolia, where tea is not only an indispensable article in the simple diet of the people, but an actual currency, is well known to the Russians, and so they have endeavoured to divert it, at least, from the direct routes via Kalgan and Kuei-hua-ch'eng to the indirect route via the Yangtze river to Vladivostok, Verkhne-Udinsk and Kiakhta. This they appear to have done to a certain extent, but at very considerable cost to the Russian Government, which has been obliged to reduce the cost of transportation of tea over the Chinese Eastern railway to a nominal sum. How long the government will be willing to grant such rebates when normal conditions have been reestablished in Mongolia, and caravan trade is once more active, remains to be seen, but this experiment shows how put to it the Russian government find themselves to divert Outer Mongolian trade from its natural channels. No fuller expose of the difficulties which confront Russian economic development in Outer Mongolia, or of the measures the government have in contemplation for improving it, can be found than in the discussion which took place in the Budgetary Commission of the National Duma on November 28th 1913. The Minister of Commerce then stated that notwithstanding the efforts heretofore made, Russian trade with Mongolia was still falling off. The organisation and development of this trade was, however, a matter for private enterprise, the government could only insure favourable conditions. The small sale of Russian goods in Mongolia was due to

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the very small purchasing capacity of the Mongols, and to the absence of organised credit. The institution of a bank in Mongolia would encourage trade and the Ministry of Finance was ready to offer its assistance to this end. The cost of railway transportation of goods for the Mongol market had been reduced and regulations have been made for the granting of customs drawback certificates and establishing a free list. Furthermore a commercial agency had been established at Urga, but as it had proved itself of limited usefulness, its duties and means of action would be extended (See Novoe Vremya, 15/21 November 1913).

The various points mentioned by the Minister of Commerce in this discussion have been referred to in previous passage of this paper, and what appear to be the real reasons for the unsatisfactory condition of Russian trade in Outer Mongolia have been given, the firmly established preference for Chinese products and the impossibility for Russian trade (exclusive of that of Kiakhta) to compete on the local markets unless assisted by preferential freight and customs rates are the principal obstacles.

The general conclusion I have reached is that nothing short of the expulsion of most of the present Russian firms and small traders now engaged in the Outer Mongolian trade<sup>1</sup> and the substitution of Mongol firms, the exclusion of all possible foreign competition, together with the maintenance of preferential treatment for home trade and

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<sup>1</sup>There are said to be in Urga 1,000 Russian subjects - exclusive of course of civil officials and the agency escort, - a considerable portion of whom are I believe Buriat Mongols. At the Mongolor Gold Mines there are said to be in the working season some two to three thousand Russians.



the forcing of all Chinese imports to come by the Vladivostock-Verhnie-Udinsk Kiakhta route, can secure to Russia the economic control of Outer Mongolia. With the right for this country to concede equally favourable trade conditions to other nationalities and the practical impossibility of excluding Chinese goods from the direct route the task seems quite an impossible one.

Certain measures have quite recently been suggested in Russia by persons and organisations taking interest in the question of Outer Mongolian trade, for the betterment of economic conditions there. One urges the improvement of the roads and waterways, another, the Irkutsk Chamber of Commerce, advises the free entry into Russia of Mongolian Products, the organisation of a veterinary service in Mongolia to combat the rinderpest, and the establishment of Russian telegraph stations and post offices. None of these measures, except the organisation of a larger veterinary service (one already exists) would appear likely to serve or in any way benefit the Mongols, or extend Russian economic control over the country.

The best Russian work on Russo-Mongol trade/ is, according to all Russians as well as men of business in Siberia and Mongolia when questioned on the subject, that published in 1910 by Bogoleipov and Sobolev entitled "Otcerki Russko-Mongoliskoi trgovli" or "Outlines of Russo Mongol trade". The conclusion reached by these writers after careful study in Mongolia and Siberia of this matter is given in Chapter XX of their work (pp 474-490). They accept the fact of the steady falling off of Russian import trade into Mongolia and of the futility of hoping to drive out Chinese competition, even if all the measures

advocated

advocated by the Russian Government, commercial organisations and individuals, are carried through. They condemn the substitution of constant governmental assistance in fostering and developing this trade, while attempting at the same time to maintain the general high cost of production of Russian goods. Individual initiative and enterprise, with which the Chinese engaged in Mongol trade are well supplied, is, in their opinion, the only hope for bettering the situation.

"The extension of Russo-Mongol trade shows how necessary it is for the individual as well as the nation to seek their power and strength within themselves. Russia turned to the East in the hope that her higher civilisation would open a market to her industry. She could not possibly expect to find a market for that industry in the West, but in the East Russian goods have appeared in the same manner as Russian industry exists within Russia, to wit under strong escort. Within Russia industry is escorted by customs duty, by preferential tariffs, by loans and supports. In the Far East the Russian merchant was always preceded by the soldier's bayonet, by concessions, privileges, special treaties and large expenditure of Government gold. Only in Mongolia has Russia appeared first on an outside market without this escort. Here she was for the first time seen advancing in a purely commercial way. Russia's right of duty free trade in Mongolia was counterbalanced by the competition of lower priced English and American goods and by the fact that the trade has, up till now, to count with considerable difficulties of conveyance and the primitive conditions of Mongol life. The result of

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this trial of open competition in a foreign market has, we much regret to say, given proof that we are not yet strong enough to maintain a purely economical position."

The remedies advocated by the writers are (1) the création of a buffer state in Northern Mongolia, (2) the stopping of Chinese colonization "a danger not only to the Mongols but to the white races", and (3) the organization of Russian trade, the principal factor of which should be the cheapening of Russian goods on the Mongol market so that they can compete with those sold by the Chinese. In urging these measures the writers seem to have lost sight of their previous contention that governmental assistance could never take the place of individual initiative, but they foreshadow correctly the policy which has since then been followed by the Russian Government.

The only way out of the difficulty of maintaining an autonomous Outer Mongolia, subject to the conditions laid down in the Urga Convention and the Peking Declaration would seem to lie in the direction of establishing a complete and hearty cooperation to that end between Russia and China for its administrative and economic development. This should include a willingness on the part of these two countries to allow the establishment of a low tariff of duties, say 5% or even 3% on all imports into the country, the customs service to be, if possible, under foreign management. This would give a certain small revenue to the government at Urga, which, added to the sums it will probably continue to receive from gold mining, timber felling rights and various other concessions and the ordinary taxes in force in the country should, with economy

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economy and honesty (two very difficult things to obtain, however), prove sufficient for their simple administrative needs, including even the maintenance of the small native cossack brigade now being organized under Russian officers, if it is not increased beyond its present force of 1100 men. If some such arrangement is not arrived at, the alternative seems to be the financing of outer Mongolia by Russia.

So far the assistance the Russian Government has given the Khalkas has been fairly, if not exclusively, confined to Ula. The first step was the organization of a small force to police the country. The Ula government showed themselves disinclined to see it undertaken, and opposed openly and childish objections, but it was not without some difficulty and the promise of some assistance to carry out the scheme that it was finally agreed to. In May or June 1918 a small Russian military division arrived, and having established a command post at a place called Sujir-surun, about five miles east of Ula, began the recruiting and instruction of a small force of cavalry, the equipment, arms, and ammunition for six light mountain guns being also provided by the Russian Government.

They have also opened a small hospital, equipped the "Kuzao-ongol printing office" where a bi-monthly paper, the first of its kind, called the "Sang-teli khaichu sitchik", or "New Mirror" is printed in Ula, but it finds very few readers. A contract has been made with an enterprising Russian to open a service of motor busses between Ula and Khamta, he assuming the charge of repairing (practically re-making) the 170 odd miles of bad road between these two places. It seems probable that some time



will elapse before this service is opened. A small school has been established (it has not over ten pupils) in which to teach the Khalkas Russian. Furthermore, nine promising Khalka boys have been placed in school in Irkutsk and about the like number at Troitskosarsk, or Kiakhta.

The old Russian concession in the Mongol town of Urga being inadequate, a much larger one of 270 désiatines has been granted the Russian Government between that town and Mai Mai Chen, and including in it the Diplomatic Agency and other official buildings. Here two or three Moscow merchants have been induced to buy lots of ground, around them high palisade fences have been put, but on them no building will ever be placed. A diminutive police force (six cossacks of the escort of the Agency) has lately been put on duty in the old Russian concession, and an enterprising Russian trader has started a cinematograph. Such were the principal signs of Russian governmental and private activity at Urga when I was there last December. Among the Khalkas their new gained liberty has not caused an awakening of any dormant energy. The Hutuketu's government have confined their activities to starting a little school in which to teach Russian, and the Ministry of War has "under consideration" the building of a prison to take the place of the horrible palisaded enclosure in which malefactors are now confined and, if reports are true, most cruelly treated. Public works of any kind (the filth in Urga is indispensible, the dead are frequently thrown by the wayside to be devoured by the herds of dogs which swarm over the whole place) will have to wait for money to come into the coffers of the state, till then at

all events, nothing can or will be done - at least it will probably be as before.

A number of very serious questions confront the Khalkas, one of which at all events must promptly be solved. There are absolutely no fundamental laws for the organisation or administration of the new confederacy. The question of the succession of the rulership has not been taken up even. Nothing has been done to strengthen the former loose organisation of the country in which Chinese authority could always be appealed to, and the always forthcoming, to guide or control their views or actions.

Although, to use the language of the 1909 Convention, it was "in accordance with the desire uniformly expressed by the Khalkas to maintain the national and historic constitution of their country that the restoration of Hutuktu was proclaimed Ruler of the Mongol People", nevertheless this choice does not appear to have coincided with the unanimous wish of the various princes and chiefs, many of whom hoped that a ruler of their own race and a member of their ancient nobility might found a dynasty to rule over them. Agitation in favour of this national solution of the dynastic question became strong during the last year and the Sair Bayin Khan, the last of the presidents of the Council of Ministers, was considered the strongest, noblest and most popular ruler the country could have to establish the new Mongol Empire.

On the other hand the Hutuktu, or as he is now styled the Bogdo Khan or "Holy Prince", though a lama, is married, has sons (his brother the Ta Lama is also blessed with children) and hopes to establish his dynasty.



While the Russian Government lends him their support for the time being, it can hardly be doubted that they would see with no particular concern the substitution of a manly intelligent, though inexperienced Mongol prince in the place of the notoriously debauched Tibetan lama. Besides his personal unfitness there is another reason for apprehension if the Hutuketu is maintained in power, which is his well-known ambition (the first Hutuketu ~~was~~ we have noted previously had the same ambition) to create an independent lamaist church in Mongolia. Any attempt to carry it out would most likely create serious internal dissensions, for the authority of the supreme Head of the Yellow Church, the <sup>13</sup> Dalai Lama of Tibet, is everywhere recognised in Mongolia, and it could not be easily put aside. Although the severance of Outer Mongolia's relation with China may enable the Hutuketu to fill all ecclesiastical offices with his creatures, such offices being no longer, as heretofore, under the control of the Government at Peking.

There are other questions, both of a political and economic nature, which must cause the well wishers of the new state grave apprehension, but enough has been said, it is thought, to justify my belief in the wisdom of the present policy of a minimum of interference on the part of the Russian government in the affairs of Outer Mongolia, so long as the cardinal principles of their defensive policy in the Far East are fully recognised by all interested powers. The strict enforcement of these principles may, so to say, carry Russia much further than she desires, but until there is a other general reversal of her policy in Far Eastern Asia it seems unlikely: things in Outer Mongolia will go on much as before.

As I finish writing I have received a copy of the very recently published work of L. Douglas Carruthers, entitled "Unknown Mongolia". In a most instructive chapter dealing with Mongolia, past and present, the writer, speaking of the secession and the establishment of the autonomous government says (p. 215-217) that "taking for granted an autonomous Mongolia under the protection of Russia, we can prophecy far-reaching and fundamental changes in the lives of the people and in the future of the Mongol race. Mongolia will become, indeed probably has already become, a land of activity and progress instead of, as formerly, a land of stagnation and suppression. Russian merchants will flock into the country, railways will be constructed, vacant lands will be used for agricultural purposes, and waste land reclaimed. There will be facilities for trade, which will prove advantageous to the Mongols as well as the Russians..... Foreigners will work gold reefs with the result that Chinese suzerainty and the church will lose no small amount of prestige. With this new movement and activity the old lethargy will no doubt decrease, and, we hope, eventually disappear".

This prophecy may some day in the far future be partly realized, but I can see no sign of such a consummation, and I must rather agree with Mr. Carruthers' other statement in the Introduction (p. 9) to his work, viz "Who would dare to prophecy the future of the marches of Siberia and China?"

(Sd.) W. W. ROCKWELL.

Peking, 10th February 1914.



1567

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[February 17.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[5785]

No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

(No. 57.)

*Foreign Office, February 17, 1914.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 51 of the 3rd instant reporting your conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the political and commercial changes which have resulted from the recent Russo-Chinese and Russo-Mongolian Agreements.

I entirely approve the language used by your Excellency on this occasion.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[2061 r-1]

Copy to India  
4 APR 1914

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

1567  
[February 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[5785]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)*

(No. 34.)

Sir,

(452) *St. Petersburg, February 3, 1914.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 30 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to report that, in a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 31st of last month, I told his Excellency that the changes which have been effected in the political and commercial situation in Central Asia by the recent Russo-Mongolian and Russo-Chinese Agreements merited, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, serious attention. On the one hand, British commercial interests were directly affected by the power accorded to the Mongolian Government, under article 3 of the Russo-Chinese Agreement, to regulate all industrial and commercial matters; while, on the other hand, the alteration in the status of Mongolia which had resulted from the recent action of the Russian Government had had an indirect and important effect on the position of Thibet. For the moment His Majesty's Government were not prepared to submit any definite proposals on the subject, but they considered that it would be necessary to discuss these questions with the Russian Government. They had consequently instructed me to inform his Excellency that they proposed, after further consideration, to submit a more detailed statement of their views and to make certain suggestions with the object of avoiding difficulties in the future.

M. Sazonof first enquired whether we had any existing commercial interests in Outer Mongolia, adding that it was a wretchedly poor country with no commercial future, and that there was, he believed, no demand for European goods, as the people lacked the necessary purchasing power. I told his Excellency that this did not tally with the information which we had received from one or two British firms, who were already doing a considerable business with the Mongols. We did not wish to see a prohibitive tariff established against British goods, and we should accordingly have to ask for the maintenance of the open door for British commerce. M. Sazonof admitted that we should be justified in doing so, but maintained that our traders were not likely to get paid for the goods with which they might supply the Mongols.

Referring next to what I had said about Thibet, his Excellency protested against the idea that the recent changes in Outer Mongolia could affect the position of Thibet. There was no connection, he asserted, between the two questions. In assisting the Mongols to secure autonomy under the suzerainty of China, Russia had acted well within her rights, and had it not been for her moderating counsels the former would have declared their complete independence.

I said that I was not disputing the correctness of Russia's action, but merely calling attention to the effect which it had had on the political situation outside Mongolia. Until I received your further instructions I could not discuss the question officially; but my personal opinion was that the veiled protectorate acquired by Russia over Outer Mongolia had considerably modified our respective positions in Asia. M. Sazonof interposed by protesting against my use of the term "protectorate" and by remarking that Russia might as well ask for compensation in the event of our extending our sphere of influence in South Africa. I replied that such a contention was very far-fetched. The Thibetans and Mongols were connected by spiritual ties; and though the treaty signed by M. Dorjief might be of no political importance for the moment, it was symptomatic of a tendency towards closer relations in the future. The changed status of Mongolia might react on Thibet, and it was but natural that we should wish to safeguard the special interests which, as Russia had expressly recognised, we possessed there. I trusted, therefore, that the suggestions which I should have eventually to submit to him would meet with favourable consideration.

His Excellency replied that he would certainly examine them in a friendly spirit; but he trusted that he would not be asked to renounce altogether the rights which Russia at present enjoyed under the Thibetan Convention, as, were he to do so without a return, he would be accused of sacrificing Russian interests. He also expressed the hope that we would not adduce the action which Russia had taken in Outer Mongolia

[2061 i—1]

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24 APR 1914

in support of what we were asking for in Thibet, as the two things ought not to be mentioned in the same breath. I said that I could tell him nothing further as to the nature of our eventual proposals, as I was not acquainted with them myself; but I could not acquiesce in what his Excellency had just said. The two questions were, to my mind, closely connected; and as Russia had no direct interests in Thibet, I trusted that, when the time came for me to lay our proposals before him, he would find it possible to meet our wishes. Our conversation was throughout of a most friendly character; but it will, I fear, be difficult to persuade M. Sazonof that we are entitled to claim in Thibet compensation for the rights which Russia is acquiring in Outer Mongolia. We are, nevertheless, justified in arguing that, in return for our recognition of Russia's privileged position in Outer Mongolia, Russia ought, on her part, to recognise the special reasons which render it necessary for us to strengthen our own position in Thibet.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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Register No.

1235  
1734

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 70. 58187

Dated 5 } Jan. 1914  
Rec. 6 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	7 Jan.	ASA	<p><u>Mongolia</u></p> <p>Chinese military position in Inner Mongolia: report by Military Attaché to British Legation, Peking.</p>
Secretary of State.....	7	J. H. M.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

July 9. I 14

Copy to India - Sec. - done.  
(in print) 2 Feb.

FOR INFORMATION.

- h.
- 3-4. Number of Chinese + Mongol troops (75,500 and 20,000, respectively) in the field.
5. Presence of ex-Russian Officers in Mongol forces.
9. Summary of present situation.  
(There is a useful sketch-map at the bottom of the collection)

Previous Papers:— 56  
5190/13

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 58187

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.

India

Secretary

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India  
\_\_\_\_\_ and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Foreign Office,


January 5, 1914.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter to Foreign Office:  
from

Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Minister at Peking No. 462 December 15, 1913.	Military Situation in Inner Mongolia.



(Similar letter sent to

)

THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[December 29.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[58187]

No. 1.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 462.)

Sir,

Peking, December 15, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 406 of the 1st November last, I have the honour to transmit herewith for your information, and with a view to its communication to the War Office, copy of a report which has been addressed to me by the military attaché at His Majesty's Legation respecting the present military situation in Inner Mongolia.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Report by Major Robertson on the Military Situation in Inner Mongolia.

SINCE the date of my last report on this subject, No. 7 of the 6th June, 1913, there has not been a great alteration in the general military situation in Eastern Mongolia. The Chinese garrisons have been reinforced, but owing to the revolution sufficient troops could not be spared during the summer to undertake energetic offensive measures against the Mongols, and their troops in Inner Mongolia have suffered a number of defeats at the hands of the latter, and are said to be in a demoralised state.

The remarks made in my last report as to the difficulty of obtaining information as to events in Inner Mongolia still hold good, European travellers who have returned from Kalgan stating that they were not even permitted to go out by the north gate of Kalgan. First hand information of any value as to the military situation is not to be had, and statements from Chinese and other sources are so conflicting that it is very difficult to obtain even an approximate idea of it.

The total number of Chinese troops stationed along the Mongolian frontier last June from the neighbourhood of Kailu Hsien to Kuei-hua-ch'eng was estimated at about 40,000. Since then over 18,000 reinforcements have been sent, and the forces in the same area are now, allowing for losses, estimated at 58,000, with another 22,500 in the area from Kailu to north of Taonan Fu, a total of 80,500. The distribution of these troops, so far as I can ascertain it, is shown in Appendix. It is roughly as follows:—

In the territory of the Cherim League from Kailu Hsien to north of Taonan Fu .. .. .	22,500
In the Jehol area, including the territory of the Chosotu League, and the south-eastern portion of the Chou-uda League .. .. .	16,000
In the territory of the Keshikteng tribe of the Chou-uda League, including Dalai Nor, Dolonor, and Chinpeng .. .. .	15,000
In the territory of the Chahar Banners, including Kalgan .. .. .	15,000
In the Kuei-hua-ch'eng district .. .. .	7,000
Total .. .. .	75,500

These troops are widely dispersed in these areas, but it is believed not in small detachments as a rule. They seem throughout the summer to have carried out the passive rôle of garrison duty and to have shown little activity in attempting to deal with wandering bands of Mongols.

There is no reliable information to be had as to the numbers of Mongols in the field, but the Japanese military attaché estimated them in June as follows:—

Taonan Fu (north of) .. .. .	1,000
In the Djassaktu Banner .. .. .	400
Near Kailu Hsien .. .. .	500
In the Uchumchin Banner .. .. .	700
Near Dalai Nor .. .. .	1,300
Near Talikangai .. .. .	3,000
In the Barun Sunid .. .. .	500
On the Urga-Kalgan road .. .. .	600
Total .. .. .	8,000

[1977 ff—3]

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6 FEB 1914

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He now estimates their numbers at 20,000 of which at least 10,000 are armed, scattered in bands of 300 to 1,000 along the frontier from near Tsitsihar to near Kuei-hua-ch'eng. He admits, however, that this is a very rough estimate and as the numbers of Mongols in the field have varied considerably from time to time, increased after a victory and diminished after a defeat, estimates as to the numbers are largely conjectural. According to Mr. Larson the leaders are all natives of Inner Mongolia who went to Urga and obtained arms, ammunition and funds, afterwards returning to Inner Mongolia, and the rank and file consist of Mongol robbers from Inner Mongolia, Chinese Hunghutzu from Manchuria and the Manchurian border, Mongols enlisted in Inner Mongolia, and Khalkas trained in Urga. It is practically certain that there are a few ex-Russian officers serving with them. The chief leaders, according to Mr. Larson, are Prince Wutai of the Djassaktu banner of the Khorchin tribe whose palace was burnt after the Taonan-fu disturbances in August 1912, and whose followers have since caused disturbances in the Cherim League. Prince Su, of Barga was the leader of the Bargut forces sent south against Dalai Nor. Malunga, a well-known Mongol robber, who is generally believed to have murdered Grant last summer, was in command of a force on the Kalgan-Urga road and is now the chief commander in the district north-west of Kalgan.

These Mongols throughout the summer have made continual raids into the country occupied by the Chinese troops, attacking small parties of the latter, and convoys of supplies and ammunition, as well as looting generally. The following is a summary of what I have been able to ascertain from various sources as to the general events on the frontier during the summer and autumn from the district north of Taonan-fu to Kuei-hua-ch'eng.

In the Taonan-fu area the Chinese do not seem to have been seriously threatened. The supplying of arms at Hailar to the inhabitants of Barga has been reported from time to time, and some apprehension was felt in September by the Tutu of Heilungchiang of raids by the Barguts into this province. The Chinese troops between Taonan-fu and Tsitsihar are somewhat scattered, and a raid from Barga into the territory of the Djalai tribe might possibly meet with some success in the first instance. The Barga Mongols, however, seem so far to have moved southwards towards Dalai Nor, rather than eastwards into the country between Tsitsihar and Taonan-fu. The officer in command of the Chinese troops at the latter place, Brigadier-General Wu Hsun-sheng, seems to have the situation in his district in hand. His troops at Taonan-fu and those near Nungan are provincial troops of Fengtien and Kirin, and are a rough lot of men recruited in many cases from the brigand class, and accustomed to campaigning against the latter, and they are probably quite capable of dealing with the Mongols in the Taonan-fu district.

The Kailu Hsien district, according to a report of the Military Governor of Jehol last June, had been captured by Mongols, but was occupied later by Feng Linko, general officer commanding 28th Division, a well-known ex-Hunghutzu, whose troops moved to Kailu from the direction of Cheng-chia-tun. This district appears now to be quiet. Generally speaking, therefore, the eastern portion of the Cherim League seems to be fairly well held by the Chinese garrisons, and serious disturbances—except, perhaps, north of Taonan-fu—need not be anticipated. This area, through which the Ssuning-kai-Taonan-fu and Changchun-Taonan-fu Railways are to run, is shown on a Chinese map issued by the Mukden Colonisation Bureau as part of the three provinces of Manchuria, and it has already been divided up into Fu, Hsien, &c.

In the Jehol area movements of Mongols were reported near Chihfeng towards the end of July, and some fighting ensued with the Yichün quartered in that district. The result of this fighting is not very clear, but the Chinese troops seem to have been unable to hold their own. At this time the rebellion on the Yangtzu was in full operation. There were very few troops left near Peking, and the commander of the Yichün, General Chiang Kuei Ti, remained at Tungchou until the result of the rebellion was no longer in doubt, and in fact for some time after. Towards the end of September the operations of the Mongols in the Chihfeng neighbourhood caused a certain amount of alarm, and soon after the election of Yuan Shih Kai in October Chiang Kuei Ti proceeded via Chinchou to take up his appointment as military governor of Jehol, taking with him 2,000 additional Yichün. Chihfeng was shortly afterwards recovered by these troops and is now in Chinese hands.

In the Dolonor and Kalgan areas, the territory of the Keshikhteng tribe, the Chinese have been less successful in holding their own than in the eastern portion of Inner Mongolia. In June they held Dalai Nor, Tawangmiao and Chinpeng, but during July and August these districts were invaded by Mongols, and it appears

that the Chinese troops were driven out. The Chinese garrisons consisted of Huai-chün, or old-fashioned Chihli provincial troops, and 5,000 Huai-chün reinforcements were sent between July and November. The Mongols after the occupation of these districts advanced on Dolonor, but there is some doubt whether they succeeded in driving out the Chinese or not. According to the Chinese press all these places are now in Chinese hands, rewards having been recently bestowed by Presidential Order on various military officers for the recapture of Chinpeng.

In the Kalgan and Kuei-hua-ch'eng areas, as a consequence of the Chinese defeat near Pangchiang in May, reinforcements were sent to this district in June and July, and again from September to November. Until the beginning of the cold weather there was no marked activity on the part of the Mongols, but about the middle of November conflicts took place in the neighbourhood of Kuei-hua-ch'eng and Tabol in which the Chinese sustained some loss. In the former district they appear to have eventually held their own, but in the latter case they retreated to within 30 miles of Kalgan, followed closely up by the Mongols. Something in the nature of a panic ensued, but reinforcements of the newly-organised 8th division, arriving on the spot, quieted matters, and the Chinese seem now to be regaining the ground they had lost.

The conflicts that have been reported do not seem to have been of a very serious nature, the reports from Chinese sources being always very much exaggerated. Missionaries living in the area near Kalgan where fighting took place state that the fighting was at long range, the Chinese and Mongols never coming to close quarters. But the general result of these conflicts in the various theatres of operation is that, in spite of the large increase in force on the borders, the Chinese troops, except in the eastern part of the Cherim League, can with difficulty hold their own. As they do not seem to show very much activity, remaining in their garrisons and allowing the Mongols to move about in the country at no great distance, it cannot be said that even the districts in which Chinese garrisons are situated are very effectively held.

It is open to question whether the Chinese are capable at the present time of effectively holding inner Mongolia in a military sense. Until conditions in China generally, and in particular on the Yang-tzu, are more settled it will probably not be considered prudent to send many more of the northern troops to Mongolia. This especially applies to the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria. In these circumstances, if more extensive operations in Mongolia are to be undertaken it will be necessary to raise new forces in the north, a measure which would be another strain on the finances of the Central Government.

The Chinese troops in Mongolia may be taken as fairly representative of the Chinese army as a whole. Some of the Manchurian provincial troops are probably the best material China has for this type of work, accustomed as they are to local conditions. The Yichün under Chiang Kuei Ti, though not modern troops, are also good material. The 3rd Division may be taken as typical of an average northern Luchün division, and the 20th Division from Manchuria is generally considered as among the best troops at China's disposal. Hence China would have difficulty in replacing these troops by much better material, and if she wishes to strengthen her military position on the Mongolian border in the near future it must be by increasing the numbers of troops there.

It was only about a year ago that there was a good deal of talk in Chinese military circles as to an expedition against outer Mongolia, and even against Russia, and the military weakness of China has now been amply demonstrated by the present situation in inner Mongolia. Whether she will succeed in holding inner Mongolia by means of conciliating the princes of the various tribes and banners is another matter.

The question of what the inner Mongols are fighting for is not very easy to solve, since, after the signing of the recent agreement between China and Russia, it is natural to suppose that orders should have been issued to the inner Mongols to cease fighting. It is possible, however, that secret instructions have been issued from Urga to the forces in the field to continue the conflict with a view to assisting the inner Mongols to obtain concessions from China. Mr. Larson considers that the leaders who have been in the field will not surrender till they are certain of what treatment will be meted out to them by the Chinese. Prince Wutai, of the Djassaktu Banner, whose palace was burnt by the Chinese, and whose place as chief of the Djassaktu Banner has been filled, is hardly likely to give in unless he is restored to his former possessions. Malunga has to account for his actions with

regard to Grant, and is hardly likely to surrender. The Barguts have not been considered in the treaty, and have, therefore, their own score to settle with China if they do not wish to be considered as part of Manchuria.

The map attached to this report is a translation of a confidential map belonging to the Russian military attaché. A number of additional place names have been added from a Japanese map.

D. S. ROBERTSON,  
*Military Attaché, Peking.*

*Peking, December 15, 1913.*

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## APPENDIX.

*Approximate distribution of Chinese Troops on Mongolian Frontier from near Taonan-fu to Kuei-hua-ch'eng.**Taonan Fu area (from near Tsitsihar to near Kailu Hsien)—*

1. North of Taonan Fu—						
Heilungchiang Mixed Brigade..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500
"    Hsünfangtui ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500
91st Infantry Regiment, 23rd Division ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500
						<hr/> 4,500
2. Near Taonan Fu—						
Mukden and Kirin Hsünfangtui, under Brigadier-General Wu Tsun Sheng ..	..	..	..	..	..	5,000
1st and 2nd Independent Cavalry Brigades organised from provincial troops ..	..	..	..	..	..	2,500
						<hr/> 7,500
3. Near Nungan—						
Kirin Mixed Brigade (raised in 1912) ..	..	..	..	..	..	3,500
Mixed detachment 23rd Division ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500
						<hr/> 5,000
4. Near Kailu—						
56th Mixed Brigade, 28th Division, under Lieutenant-General Feng Linko ..	..	..	..	..	..	4,000
Yichun ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500
						<hr/> 5,500

*Jehol area (including Chaoyang, Chibfeng, and districts in Southern Chou-nda League—*

Yichun, under General Chiang Kuei Ti ..	..	..	..	..	..	7,500
Jehol Mixed Brigade ..	..	..	..	..	..	3,500
"    Hsun Fang Tui ..	..	..	..	..	..	3,500
80th Infantry Regiment, 20th Division ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500
						<hr/> 16,000

*Dolonor area (including Dalai Nor and Chinpeng)—*

Huai chün ..	..	..	..	..	..	8,500
Chihli Lienchün ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,000
Yichun ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500
Imperial Guard (1 ying) ..	..	..	..	..	..	500
1st Division ..	..	..	..	..	..	3,000
3rd .. (3 squadrons) ..	..	..	..	..	..	500
						<hr/> 15,000

*Kalgan area (including the Kalgan-Dolonor road and the Kalgan-Tatung Railway—*

1st Division ..	..	..	..	..	..	3,000
3rd ..	..	..	..	..	..	4,000
8th ..	..	..	..	..	..	3,500
79th Infantry Regiment, 20th Division ..	..	..	..	..	..	2,000
1 squadron cavalry ..	..	..	..	..	..	
1 battery artillery ..	..	..	..	..	..	
Chahar Hsin Fang Tui ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,000
Independent Cavalry Brigade ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500
						<hr/> 15,000

*Kuei-hua-ch'eng area—*

1st Division ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,000
1st Shansi Division ..	..	..	..	..	..	3,000
Imperial Guard ..	..	..	..	..	..	500
3rd Division ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500
Shansi Banner troops ..	..	..	..	..	..	1,000
						<hr/> 7,000

Grand total .. .. . 75,500

58187

DEC 29 1913

Peking, December 15, 1913

COPY

No. 462

Sir,

Military Attache

Report No. 14  
of 15/12/13

With reference to my Despatch No. 406  
of November 1st, last, xx I have the honour to  
transmit herewith for your information, and with a  
view to its communication to the War Office copy of  
a report, as marked in the margin which has been  
addressed to me by the Military Attache at His  
Majesty's Legation respecting the present  
military situation in Inner Mongolia.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir

Your most obedient, humble servant,

(signed) J.N. Jordan

The Right Honourable

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., M. P.,

etc., etc., etc.,



SUBJECT. MILITARY SITUATION IN INNER MONGOLIA.

Report 14/1913.

From Military Attaché, Peking.

15th December 1913.

58187

DEC 29 1913

Since the date of my last report on this subject, No.7/1913, dated 26th June, there has not been a great alteration in the general military situation in Eastern Mongolia. The Chinese garrisons have been reinforced, but owing to the Revolution sufficient troops could not be spared during the summer to undertake energetic offensive measures against the Mongols, and their troops in Inner Mongolia have suffered a number of defeats at the hands of the latter, and are said to be in a demoralised state.

The remarks made in my last report as to the difficulty of obtaining information as to events in Inner Mongolia still hold good, European travellers who have returned from Kalgan stating that they were <sup>not</sup> even permitted to go out by the north gate of Kalgan. First hand information of any value as to the military situation is not to be had, and statements from Chinese and other sources are so conflicting that it is very difficult to obtain even an approximate idea of it.

The total number of Chinese troops stationed along the Mongolian frontier last June from the neighbourhood of Kailu Hsien to Kuoi-hua-ch'eng was estimated at about 40,000. Since then over 18,000 reinforcements have been sent, and the forces in the same area are now, allowing for losses, estimated at 58,000, with another 20,500 in the area from Kailu to north of Taonan Fu, a total of 78,500. The distribution of these troops, so far as I can ascertain it, is shown in appendix. It is roughly as follows:-

In the territory of the Cherin League from Kailu Hsien to N. of Taonan Fu.	22,500.
In the Jehol area including the territory of the Chosoiu League and the South-Eastern portion of the Chou-uda League.	16,000
In the territory of the Keshikteng Tribe of the Chou-uda League including Dalai Nor, Dolonor and Chinpeng.	15,000
In the territory of the Chahar Banners including Kalgan.	15,000
In the Kuei-hua-ch'eng district.	7,000
Total.	<u>75,500</u>

These troops are widely dispersed in these areas, but it is believed not in small detachments as a rule. They seem throughout the summer to have carried out the passive rôle of garrison duty and to have shown little activity in attempting to deal with wandering bands of Mongols.

There is no reliable information to be had as to the numbers of Mongols in the field, but the Japanese Military Attaché estimated them in June as follows:-

Taonan Fu (North of)	1,000
In the Djassaktu Banner.	400
Near Kailu Hsien	500
In the Uchunchin Banner	700 and 2 Field guns.
Near Dalai Nor	1,300
Near Walikangai	3,000
In the Barun Sunid	500
On the Urga-Kalgan road	600
Total	<u>8,000</u>

He now estimates their numbers at 20,000 of which at least 10,000 are armed, scattered in bands of 500 to 1,000 along the frontier from near Tsitsihar to near Kuei-hua-ch'eng. He admits however that this a very rough estimate and as the numbers of Mongols in the field have varied considerably from time to time, increased after a victory and diminished after

a defeat, estimates as to the numbers are largely conjectural. According to Mr. Larson the leaders are all natives of Inner Mongolia who went to Urga and obtained arms, ammunition and funds, afterwards returning to Inner Mongolia, and the rank and file consist of Mongol robbers from Inner Mongolia, Chinese Hunghutsu from Manchuria and the Manchurian border, Mongols enlisted in Inner Mongolia, and Khalkas trained in Urga. It is practically certain that there are a few ex-Russian officers serving with them. The chief leaders, according to Mr. Larson, are Prince Wutai of the Djassaktu Banner of the Khorchin tribe whose palace was burnt after the Taonan Fu disturbances in August 1912 and whose followers have since caused disturbances in the Cherim League. Prince Su of Barga was the leader of the Barga forces sent south against Dalai Nor. Malunga, a well-known Mongol robber who is generally believed to have murdered Grant last summer, was in command of a force on the Kalgan-Urga road and is now the chief commander in the district N.W. of Kalgan.

These Mongols throughout the summer have made continual raids into the country occupied by the Chinese troops, attacking small parties of the latter, and convoys of supplies and ammunition, as well as looting generally. The following is a summary of what I have been able to ascertain from various sources as to the general events on the frontier during the summer and autumn from the district north of Taonan Fu to Kuei-hua-ch'eng.

In the Taonan Fu area the Chinese do not seem to have been seriously threatened. The supplying of arms at Hailar to the inhabitants of Barga has been reported from



time to time, and some apprehension was felt in September by the Tutu of Heilungchiang of raids by the Barguts into this province. The Chinese troops between Taonan Fu and Tsitsihar are somewhat scattered, and a raid from Barga into the territory of the Djalai Tribe might possibly meet with some success in the first instance. The Barga Mongols, however, seem so far to have moved southwards towards Dalai Nor rather than eastwards into the country between Tsitsihar and Taonan Fu. The officer in command of the Chinese troops at the latter place, Brigadier-General Wu Hsueh sheng, seems to have the situation in his district in hand. His troops at Taonan Fu and those near Nungan are provincial troops of Fengtien and Kirin and are a rough lot of men recruited in many cases from the brigand class, and accustomed to campaigning against the latter and they are probably quite capable of dealing with the Mongols in the Taonan Fu district.

The Kailu Hsien district, according to a report of the Military Governor of Jehol last June, had been captured by Mongols, but was occupied later by Feng Linko, G.C.C. XXVIIIth Division, a well-known ex-Hunghutzu, whose troops moved to Kailu from the direction of Cheng-chia-tun. This district appears now to be quiet. Generally speaking, therefore, the Eastern portion of the Cheria League seems to be fairly well held by the Chinese garrisons, and serious disturbances, except perhaps north of Taonan Fu, need not be anticipated. This area, through which the Ssipingkai-Taonan Fu and Changshun-Taonan Fu Railways are to run, is shown on a Chinese map, issued by the Mukden Colonization Bureau as

part of the three provinces of Manchuria and it has already been divided up into Hu, Hsien etc.

In the Jehol area, movements of Mongols were reported near Chihfeng towards the end of July and some fighting ensued with the Yichün quartered in that district. The result of this fighting is not very clear, but the Chinese troops seem to have been unable to hold their own. At this time the rebellion on the Yangtzu was in full operation. There were very few troops left near Peking, and the Commander of the Yichün, General Chiang Kuei Ti, remained at Tungchou until the result of the rebellion was no longer in doubt, and in fact for some time after. Towards the end of September the operations of the Mongols in the Chihfeng neighbourhood caused a certain amount of alarm and soon after the election of Yuan Shih Kai in October Chiang Kuei Ti proceeded via Chinchou to take up his appointment as Military Governor of Jehol taking with him 8,000 additional Yichün. Chihfeng was shortly afterwards recovered by these troops and is now in Chinese hands.

In the Deloner and Halgan areas, the territory of the Keshikhteng tribe, the Chinese have been less successful in holding their own than in the Eastern portion of Inner Mongolia. In June they held Dalai Nor, Tawangniao and Chingpeng, but during July and August these districts were invaded by Mongols and it appears that the Chinese troops were driven out. The Chinese garrisons consisted of Huai chün, or old-fashioned Chihli Provincial troops, and 5,000 Huai chün reinforcements were sent between July and November. The Mongols

after the occupation of these districts advanced on Dolonor, but there is some doubt whether they succeeded in driving out the Chinese or not. According to the Chinese press all these places are now in Chinese hands, rewards having been recently bestowed by Presidential order on various military officers for the recapture of Chinpeng.

In the Kalgan and Kuei-hua-ch'ong areas, as a consequence of the Chinese defeat near Pangchiang in May, reinforcements were sent to this district in June and July, and again from September to November. Until the beginning of the cold weather there was no marked activity on the part of the Mongols, but about the middle of November conflicts took place in the neighbourhood of Kuei-hua-ch'eng and Tabol in which the Chinese sustained some loss. In the former district they appear to have eventually held their own, but in the latter case they retreated to within 30 miles of Kalgan followed closely up by the Mongols. Something in the nature of a panic ensued, but reinforcements of the newly organized VIIIth Division, arriving on the spot, quieted matters and the Chinese seem now to be regaining the ground they had lost.

The conflicts that have been reported do not seem to have been of a very serious nature, the reports from Chinese sources being always very much exaggerated. Missionaries living in the area near Kalgan where fighting took place state that the fighting was at long range, the Chinese and Mongols never coming to close quarters. But the general result of these conflicts in the various theatres of operation is that, in spite of the large increase in force on the borders, the Chinese troops, except in the Eastern part of the Cherim League,



(9.)  
~~(7)~~

can with difficulty hold their own. As they do not seem to show very much activity, remaining in their garrisons and allowing the Mongols to move about in the country at no great distance, it cannot be said that even the districts in which Chinese garrisons are situated are very effectively held.

It is open to question whether the Chinese are capable at the present time of effectively holding Inner Mongolia in a military sense. Until conditions in China generally, and in particular on the Yangtzu, are more settled it will probably not be considered prudent to send many more of the Northern troops to Mongolia. This especially applies to the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria. In these circumstances, if more extensive operations in Mongolia are to be undertaken it will be necessary to raise new forces in the north, a measure which would be another strain on the finances of the Central Government.

The Chinese troops in Mongolia may be taken as fairly representative of the Chinese Army as a whole. Some of the Manchurian Provincial troops are probably the best material China has for this type of work, accustomed as they are to local conditions. The Yichŭn under Chiang Kuei Ti, though not modern troops, are also good material. The IIIrd Division may be taken as typical of an average Northern Luchŭn Division, and the XXth Division from Manchuria is generally considered as among the best troops at China's disposal. Hence China would have difficulty in replacing these troops by much better material, and if she wishes to strengthen her military position on the Mongolian border

~~(11)~~

in the near future it must be by increasing the numbers of troops there.

It was only about a year ago that there was a good deal of talk in Chinese military circles as to an expedition against Outer Mongolia and even against Russia and the military weakness of China has now been amply demonstrated by the present situation in Inner Mongolia. Whether she will succeed in holding Inner Mongolia by means of conciliating the Princes of the various tribes and banners is another matter.

The question of what the Inner Mongols are fighting for is not very easy to solve, since after the signing of the recent agreement between China and Russia it is natural to suppose that orders should have been issued to the Inner Mongols to cease fighting. It is possible however that secret instructions have been issued from Urga to the forces in the field to continue the conflict, with a view to assisting the Inner Mongols to obtain concessions from China. Mr. Larson considers that the leaders who have been in the field will not surrender till they are certain of what treatment will be meted out to them by the Chinese. Prince Wutai of the Djassaktu Banner, whose palace was burnt by the Chinese and whose place as chief of the Djassaktu Banner has been filled is hardly likely to give in unless he is restored to his former possessions. Halunga has to account for his actions with regard to Grant and is hardly likely to surrender. The Barguts have not been considered in the treaty, and have therefore their own score to settle with China if they do

(11.)  
~~(9)~~

not wish to be considered as part of Manchuria.

The map attached to this report is a translation of a confidential map belonging to the Russian Military Attaché. A number of additional place names have been added from a Japanese map.

*D. Robertson* Major,  
Military Attaché, Peking.

Copy to Chief of General Staff, India.



# APPENDIX.

Approximate distribution of Chinese troops on Mongolian frontier from near Taonan Fu to Kuei-hua-ch'eng.

Taonan Fu area. from near Tsitsihar to near Kailu Hsien.

## 1. North of Taonan Fu.

Heilungchiang Mixed Brigade.	1,500
" " Hsümfangtui	1,500
91st Infantry Regt. XXIIIrd Division	1,500
	<hr/> 4,500 <hr/>

## 2. Near Taonan Fu.

Mukden and Kirin Hsümfangtui, under Br.-General Wu Tsun Sheng.	5,000
1st and 2nd Independent Cavalry Brigades organized from Provincial troops.	2,500
	<hr/> 7,500 <hr/>

## 3. Near Nungan.

Kirin Mixed Brigade (raised in 1912)	3,500
Mixed Detachment XXIIIrd Division.	1,500
	<hr/> 5,000 <hr/>

## 4. Near Kailu.

56th Mixed Brigade XXVIIIth Division, under Lieut.-General Feng Linko.	4,000
Yichün.	1,500
	<hr/> 5,500 <hr/>

Jehol area. Including Chaoyang, Chihfeng and districts in Southern Chou-uda League.

Yichün under General Chiang Kuei Ti	7,500
Jehol Mixed Brigade.	3,500
" Hsün Fang Tui	3,500
80th Infantry Regt. XXth Division.	1,500
	<hr/> 16,000 <hr/>

Dolonor area including Dalai Nor and Chinpeng.

Huai chün.	8,500
Chihli Lienchün	1,000
Yichün.	1,500
Imperial Guard. 1 ying.	500
1st Division.	3,000
IIIrd " 3 squadrons.	500
	<hr/> 15,000 <hr/>

(1)

Kalgan area including the Kalgan-Dolonor road and the Kalgan-Tatung Railway.

1st Division.	3,000
IIIrd "	4,000
VIIIth "	3,500
79th Regt. XXth Division )	
1 Squadron Cavalry. )	2,000
1 battery Artillery. )	
Chahar Hsün Fang Tui	1,000
Independent Cavalry Brigade.	1,500
	<hr/>
	25,000
	<hr/>

Kuci-hua-ch'eng, area.

1st Division.	1,000
1st Shansi Division.	3,000
Imperial Guard.	500
IIIrd Division.	1,500
Shansi Banner troops.	1,000
	<hr/>
	7,000
	<hr/>

Grand Total 75,500.

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1234

Register No.

56

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O. 58000

Dated 3 January 1914  
Rec. 5

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	6 Jan	AW	<p><u>Mongolia</u></p> <p>The Mongolian Mission to St. Petersburg. Mongolian claims to independence: attitude of Russian Govt.</p>
Secretary of State.....	6	T.W.H	
Committee.....	8	E	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

Copy to India  
16 JAN 1914  
reprint 30 Jan.

FOR INFORMATION.

P. 2. Russia denies the right of the Mongolian Govt to negotiate direct with "other sovereign states."

It will be remembered that the question of entering into direct relations with the Mongolian Govt was discussed in our letter to the F.O. of 19 Nov. 1913 (P. 4614/13) and in Mr. Alston's despatch of 21 Nov. 1913 (P. 5190/13, p. 9)

3. Repudiation by Mongolian Govt of Chinese suzerainty.

3. The Mongolian claim to the all right to annex any territory inhabited by Mongolians, is to including

Seen Pol. Com'co.,  
13 JAN 1914

Previous Papers:—

5190/13 etc

including Inner Mongolia within their borders,  
is an embarrassing one to Russia, in  
view of the claims of Japan to special  
interests in Inner Mongolia. (See rejoined  
Extract from the Times of 6 January 1914)

THE MONGOLIAN MISSION TO  
RUSSIA.

CONSIDERATION FOR CHINA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 5.

The Mongolian Mission has left for Moscow, and is returning home. The efforts to obtain money and arms from the Russian Government have not proved successful in the sense desired by the envoys. The Russian Government is quite willing to continue to assist the Mongolians pecuniarily and in the military sense, but only so far as such assistance does not constitute a menace to peaceful relations with China.

On a previous occasion the money and arms obtained by the Khutukhta were used to promote uprisings in Inner Mongolia, which were repressed by the Chinese with great severity. Russia cannot, under the guise of friendship for the Mongolians, foster their ambitions for combining Outer with Inner Mongolia, and thereby imperil her arrangement with China and provoke the suspicion of Japan. Apart from this, the result of the Mongolian Mission may well be regarded as eminently satisfactory for the interests of all countries concerned, as will doubtless be shown at the impending conference *à trois* at Urga.

Baron Motono, the Japanese Ambassador, has returned here after an absence of eight months in Japan which was necessitated by reasons of health.

"Times"

6<sup>th</sup> January 1914

It seems possible that the present Russian attitude - of minimising the independent position of Mongolia - may be influenced by an "intelligent anticipation" of our intention to use the Mongolian analogy in support of our proposals in regard to Tibet.

THE MONGOLIAN ENVOYS IN  
RUSSIA.

*M. Post* 6/2/14

RESULTS OF THE MISSION.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, Jan. 5.

The Mongolian Special Mission leaves finally on Thursday. The members were received by the President of the Duma, who explained that the Duma had nothing whatever to do with foreign policy. The negotiations have evidently been hampered by the continuance of unavowed hostilities between Mongolia and China, but it is believed that arrangements have already been made for a loan of 3,000,000 roubles (£300,000). In regard to the Mongolian request for armaments it is reported that Russia expressed her willingness to comply with the request in principle, but prefers to postpone the supply of weapons until hostilities in every form cease. The negotiations will be continued at Kiakhta, with Consul-General Miller as the representative of Russia.

"  
Morning Post,"

6th January 1914



In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 58099

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.



56

1914

Inc 3. (1.)

H/5190/13

✓  
Cite 2nd  
for info

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India  
\_\_\_\_\_ and, by direction of the Secretary  
of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.*


*Foreign Office,*

*January 3, 1914.*

*Reference to previous correspondence:*

Letter <sup>to</sup> Foreign Office:  
from

*Description of Inclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>H. M. Ambassador at St. Petersburg No. 393 December 24, 1913.</i>	<i>Mongolia</i> 

*(Similar letter sent to*

*)*



THIBET AND MONGOLIA.

[December 29.]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 1.

[58099]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)*

(No. 393.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the accompanying letter which was left at this embassy a few days ago by a member of the Mongolian mission that is at present at St. Petersburg.

I took advantage of a conversation which I had yesterday with M. Korostovetz, who negotiated and signed the Russo-Mongolian Convention of 1912, to consult him with regard to several passages in this letter. He told me that it was nonsense for the Mongolians to pretend that the notes exchanged and the declaration signed at Peking had given them a free hand in the matter of railways and telegraphs, or had accorded them the right to enter into direct relation with other Sovereign States. Their claim to complete independence was also entirely unfounded, as well as the right which they asserted to annex portions of Inner Mongolia. The Mongols were very difficult people to deal with. They had insisted on inserting the word "Mongolia" without any qualifying term in the convention which he had signed, but he had in a written document reserved to Russia the right of subsequently defining the exact limits of the territory referred to in the convention. The Mongols, he added, based their claim to Inner Mongolia on the ground that now that the Manchu dynasty had fallen, the provinces ceded by them to China centuries ago once more reverted to them.

M. Sazonof, to whom I also mentioned the matter, confirmed what M. Korostovetz had told me, and said that Russian, Chinese, and Mongolian delegates were shortly to meet, I think he said at Kiakhta, and to proceed with the delimitation of Outer Mongolia. Their task would not be an easy one, and he need not remind me that Russia was precluded by her secret convention with Japan from allowing any portion of Inner to be incorporated in Outer Mongolia.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Letter left at British Embassy in St. Petersburg by Member of Mongolian Mission.*

(Traduction.)

A son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté britannique.


PAR la volonté de mon maître, le Souverain de Mongolie, et de son Gouvernement, je suis chargé, M. l'Ambassadeur, de vous faire part, à titre de renseignement, de ce qui suit :—

Au moment de la chute en Chine de la dynastie mandchoue, à laquelle elle était liée par un pacte spécial, la Mongolie, à l'effet de sauvegarder son unité et son indépendance nationales et l'intégrité de son territoire, se déclara État indépendant et souverain. Comme tel, elle a été reconnue par l'Empire limitrophe de Russie, qui a conclu avec elle à Ourga, le 21 octobre (v.s.), 1912, une convention politique et un protocole de commerce, et maintenant la Russie a signé à Pékin, le 23 octobre (5 novembre), 1913, une déclaration, et un échange des notes concernant la Mongolie eut lieu entre les Gouvernements russe et chinois.

Après avoir examiné la déclaration et les notes susmentionnées, le Gouvernement mongol fit part au Gouvernement Impérial de Russie et au Gouvernement de la République chinoise de sa manière de voir par rapport de ces documents.

Le Gouvernement mongol a pu constater avec la plus vive satisfaction que lesdits documents comportaient la sanction de la part de l'Empire de Russie et de la

[1977 ff—1]





République chinoise de l'indépendance de l'État mongol, auquel était garantie pleine liberté dans toutes les affaires touchant à l'administration intérieure, au commerce, à l'industrie, aux lignes de chemin de fer et de télégraphe, et dans toutes les questions financières et économiques, avec toutes les conséquences résultant de cet état de choses, ainsi qu'une parfaite liberté de traiter amicalement avec d'autres États souverains. L'engagement formel pris par les Gouvernements de Russie et de Chine de ne point intervenir dans les affaires intérieures de la Mongolie, de ne point envoyer ni maintenir en Mongolie aucune force militaire, ni aucun agent administratif, de ne point recourir à la colonisation par leurs sujets du territoire de la Mongolie constitue, au point de vue du Gouvernement mongol, une garantie sûre de l'indépendance de l'État mongol.

Néanmoins, le Gouvernement de Mongolie a cru de son devoir de rappeler aux Gouvernements de l'Empire de Russie et de la République chinoise qu'il a toujours maintenu, et maintient encore, que la Mongolie a rompu définitivement tous liens avec la Chine et qu'aucun droit de suzeraineté ne peut être reconnu à personne sur la Mongolie sans son approbation. En conséquence, le Gouvernement mongol se réserve une parfaite liberté d'appréciation touchant certains points de la déclaration et des notes diplomatiques ayant trait aux relations entre la Chine et la Mongolie. En particulier, la Mongolie affirme son droit d'annexer les territoires qui ont toujours fait corps avec elle et à une telle délimitation de ses frontières qui comprendrait toutes les peuplades de race mongol qui ont déjà adhéré à l'État mongol. Sous ces réserves le Gouvernement de Mongolie se déclare prêt à prendre part aux pourparlers entre la Russie, la Chine et la Mongolie, prévus par la déclaration et les notes susindiquées.

De plus, le Gouvernement de Mongolie, désireux de rétablir le plus tôt possible la bonne entente entre la Mongolie et les États limitrophes, a donné ordre à ses troupes de suspendre les opérations militaires contre les troupes chinoises et d'évacuer les positions avancées qu'elles occupaient, et il a adressé en même temps, par l'intermédiaire du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie et du Ministre de Chine à Saint-Petersbourg, l'invitation au Gouvernement chinois d'avoir à retirer les troupes qui ont envahi le territoire de la Mongolie intérieure dont la population est intimement liée avec nous par affinités de race.

Vous voudrez bien, M. l'Ambassadeur, faire part à votre Gouvernement du contenu de ce mémoire, et agréer, &c.

Chargé de mission extraordinaire, Président du Conseil  
des Ministres de Mongolie,

SAÏN-NOÏN-KHAN NAMNAN-SOUROUN.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le     jour du mois moyen d'hiver de la  
III<sup>e</sup> année de l'ère "Olana ergougdeksen" (élu par tous).*



#### Source Citation

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